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Introduction
The following discussion focuses.on:the :cur-r:ent
situation as regards U.S. oil interests worldwide ·o"f'fsirort!.•
Itdiv.jdes into three general areas: l}:a"genera'l,view
of the scope of the U.S. oil companies" investmerrtsoffsh.ore"
foreign and domestic, 2} an analysis ofthe~ecen:t
rise to power of the Organization of Petroleum :Expor-ting
Countries (OPEC) and the ensuing problems Cteated
"for U.S. oil investments abroad, and 3} a brief his-to-cyand
a discussion of U.S. oil interests in the law of the
sea as an expression of their concern for resolution
to OPEC-like problems.
The term U.S. oil interests is used repeatedly.
In this discussion it refers to U.S. oil companies'
interests as opposed to Government's interest. It
refers to international oil companies' interests as
opposed to domestic companies' interests. Often the
interests of all three are the same. As will be seen,
however, the Government's view must necessarily con-
sider other interest groups besides petroleum, and
the domestic oil companies are more concerned with
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maintaining the domestic production of crude
an operation,which"as w~,$hall see,benefits from
higher OPEC prices. Often the domestic and inter-
national compam~sare one and the same. The problem
then arises of having divided interests. This is,
more often than not, the case. In fac~ while there
are oil companies which are strictly domestic
(American Petroleum Institute list ower 800
members), to this author's know l edqeco f the 10
or so international oil companies discussed in this
paper, all are involved in the domestic field
as well.
This discussion relies upon common sense when
associating OPEC with the law of the sea. Both subjects
are infinitely vast and certainly no one decision
or link exists between the two. Rather, an under-
standing of their interr01ated aspects emerges clearly
when one considers current developments in both
areas. The author views OPEC basically as the
problem and the law of the sea as the search for the
sOlution. The oil drama is being played more and more
o
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offshore. OPEC has most of: tile ot 1 ;: OPEC bas
provided U.S. investors with investment:securt~y
problems. The law of the se a .i s t nv es t men t i secur t.ty
oriented. T:le key is t nves tmentrs ecur t ty . ,WewiTl
look specifically at what U.S. oil"companies ha~e
pa i d to DPEC for the ri ght to produce: oi 1 in .the ir
countries. We will look specifically at which nations
have expropriated or nationalized U.S. investments.
We will get as close to the present as we can in
looking at the state of law of the sea negotiations
as regards the seabeds. For the sake of discussion,
some basic assumptions concerning the law of the
sea will have to be made, but the author realizes these
assumptions have not been fully rleveloped by the
various author nations.
At the outset then, and knowing full well what
lies in the following discussion, it is safe to say that
U.S. oil interests in the law of the sea are significant
and oriented towards the future.
o( )j
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Chapter I The Investment
In 1946 the U.S. oil industry entered the offshore
market. Most of this development has occurred in the
Gulf of Mexico off the shores of Louisiana and Texas.
T.D. Barrow reconstructs the 15 year history between
1951 and 1965 in his book, Exploration and Economics of
the Petroleum Industry. During this period approximately
$160 million was invested in seismic surveys in marine
areas, and approximately $1 billion was amassed in lease
purchases. The cost of wildcat drilling during this
period was $280 million. Total exploration expenses
during this period were approximately $1.6 billion.
Barrow estimates that ultimate production from this
period would amount to approximately 3.6 billion barrels
of oil and 49 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
U.S. domestic oil interests offshore operate under
the aegis of the coastal state within the 3 mile limit
as per the SUbmerged Lands Act of 1953. Seaward of this
limit. the Department of Interior controls leasing under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Bidding on oil and gas is permitted to be
either on the basis of cash bonus or royalty
at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior with royalty to be not less than
12.5 percent in any case. The Act provides
that oil and gas leases shall cover not more
than 5760 acres and shall be for a period
of 5 years and as long thereafter as oil or
gas m~y.be pr~?uced from the area in paying
quantltles •••
2In the recently concluded September T972:biddigg:for
74 offshore tracts in the Gulf -o f Me-xico, ~$1~694:PIH
acre for 346,000 acres of potential1y- rich leases"
established a record high price paid:tothe_ Department
of Interior. 2 On December 18, 1972 another lease .euc t i.on
was held and a:new record high was established when
Trans-Ocean Group, a combination of 8 oil companies,
bid $21,630 per acre. The total of all bids for the
December auction was $1.6 bi11ion. 3
Under the authority of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act 2.5 billion barrels of oil,
14.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
andI1(IE!ar 1y 3 billion gallons of natural gas
liquids have been produced with bonuses,
rentals and royalty payments accruing to the
U.S. Treasury from 1953 tijrough 1971 in the
amount of $6,456,688,788.
The world's offshore oil industry began in the U.S.
To date over 15,000 wells have been drilled off U.S.
coasts. There are presently more than 400 drilling units
worldwide working off the coasts of 70 nations. (See
Appendix A for a list of nations involved in offshore
activity. See Appendix B for the geographic location
of worldwide offshore reserves.) F.J. Gardener of Oil
and Gas Journal reports that oi 1 or gas has now been found
oo
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in 37 countries offshore; "25 of these are now on
commercial production, and the other dozen - Ireland,
Dahomey, South Africa, New Zealand, Holland, Spain,
Zaire, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Ecuador - could enter
the oil column soon".5 ...
. .. '-
The generally acknowledged areas of oil and gas
potential around the world are as follows: Indonesian
waters, the North Sea, off West Africa, the Mediterranean,
the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea, off northwestern
Australia, off Canada's Maritimes, the Caribbean Sea,
off the west coast of South America, off the Atlantic
coasts of both North and South America, off California,
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Arctic Ocean.
Of the 15 or so largest international oil companies,
6
approximately two thirds are U.S. owned:
Standard Oil (New Jersey)*
Gulf
Mobil
Standard Oil (California)
Texaco
Continental
Marathon
Occidental Petroleum
Amerada Hess
Grace Petroleum
*Exxon
A detailed analysis of which companies have onvestments
in specific geographic regions throughout the world,
0··
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if it were to be current and c cmp l ete, is ma te'r t.a l ,enuu:gD
for an e ntft II'epa per. For purpo s e 6f: 0 ur dis cus s t.on., we
shall make the basic assumption thattbese above merrttonen
oil companies collectively are involved in .a csi-gni'fi::c:ant
manner in 1.11 of the offshore er ees mentioned. 'Ttee
following comments pertain to a s amp l i nq of s ome iof tiles:e
investments.
In the 1971 Standard Oil of California annual repor-t,
the Compan7 told its stockholders that "oil produc.tion
is rising steadily, principally in the Eastern Hemisph:ere •.. ,,7
For 1971 Standard Oil of California lists in part th~
following erude oil or natural gas liquid production.
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Iran
Libya
1,363,300 barrels per day
360,000
284,300
130,800
N.B. Figures include interests in affiliates
Aramco, Iranian Oil Consortium, and Caltex
Pacific Indonesia.
Exxon lists 2,349,000 barrels per day production from the
Middle East and Africa, and 175,800 barrels per day from
Australia and the Far East in its 1971 an~ual report. S
Amerada Hess lists for 1971 240,262 barrels per day from
Amerada/Shell joint operations in Libya. Amerada Hess
further states that du\ing 1971 an agreement was concluded
o
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with National Iranian Oil Company "to explore approx-
imately 1400 square miles in the Persian Gulf, and
(Amerada Hess) acquired new concessions offshore
Abu Dhabi ... "9 The 1971 annual report from Texaco
contains a chart entitled "Texaco's Worldwide Operation".
This chart indicates offshore oil production in Nigeria
and Indonesia. It further indicates exploration activity
offshore Australia, Trinidad and Tobago, and South
West Africa. 10 Texaco lists in part the following world-
wide gross production from crude oil and natural gas liquid.
Texaco and subsidiaries
Iran
Venezuela
Liberia
Dubai
Nigeria
I
255,000 barrels per day
141,500
131,000
13,000
5,000
Nonsubsidiary companies
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Bahrain
1,333,000 barrels per day
360,000
37,000
Tenneco, a diversified, multi-market company, as per the~r
1971 annual report, is involved in exploratory drilling in
the North Sea. l l Continental Oil Company in its 1971
annual report states that it has discovered oil in the
Fateh Field offshore Dubai. 12 Occidental Petroleum
Company in its 1971 annual report states that Venezuela,
o
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Nigeria, Peru, and the North Sea ar~ areas:6f'm~jor
foreign exploration. 13 Atlanti-c..;Richf:ie]d~Company·tn
its 1971 annual report list in part: the following
figures for crude oil and natural gas production: 14
Indonesia
Iran
Libya
Venezuel a
1 ,1.62 . barre] s .. per ~d~y
76-,755
21,5D5
111",T97
Most of the above mentioned companies are active in the
u.s. offshore markets of California and the Gu1f'of
Mexico. The newest domestic market, Alaska. will be
introduced to the lower 48 states partially via a pipeline
owned by the following companies. 15
AReo
British Petroleum
Exxon
Mobil
Phill~ps Petroleum
Amerada Hess
28.08
28.08
25.52
8.68
3.32
3.00
percent
o
Most of the above mentioned companies are involved in the
North Sea as well. The final list of figures in our
more or less random sample of domestic and foreign U.S.
oil interests lists the major international oil companies
by percentage of ownership in the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil production. 16
o
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Exxon 18.3 percent
British Petroleum 15.5
Royal Dutch/Shell 11 .5
Gulf 9.5
Texaco 8.7
Standard Oil (Calif) 8.1
Mobil 5.3
Presently, there are 11 members in OPEC: Indonesia,
Algeria, Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq,
Nigeria, libya, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar.
While the preceding figures do not delineate clearly
between offshore and onshore production, they do indicate
that u.S. foreign and domestic oil interests are substantial.
J. McCaslin, exploration editor, OiQ and Gas Journal,
states that Persian Gulf offshore production for 1971
totaled 2,868,000 barrels per day, compared to 2,664,000
barrels per day in 1970. 17 McCaslin states further,
Venezuela, lake Maracaibo fields, produced 2,803,000
barrels per day in 1971, and Saudi Arabia cumulative
offshore production for that year totaled 2.8 billion
barrels. 18 McCaslin lists total oil output worldwide for
1971 at 48,221,000 barrels per day and total wouldwide
marine oil output for 1971 at 8,760,000 barrels per day.
Based upon these figures, over 18 percent of the 1971
worldwide oil production was offshore. Combining the
figures for Venezuela and the Persian Gulf as a percentage
of the worldwide offshore total, by this author's \..
8cal cul ati on, i ndi cates that ne ar l y . 65' percent .o'f :ttte
offshore total emanates f.r om: t hes e : two .a eeas . Mc·CasTi,""
lists U.S. offshore pr oduc ti on. at'l ~692~OOO:barr:eEs
per day; he groups the remaining 1~397~OOObar~els
per day under "Others". Thes e 'latter-two soucces.,
then, would account for the remaining 35 per-cerrt.
Thus, in the aggregate view all of these -figures imply
that our original assumption, that U.S. international
oil companies' interests in foreign and domestic
offshore production is significa~t, would appear
to be a reasonable assumption.
o
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Chapter 2 The Problem
Much of what one reads in the newspapers today
regarding the oil industry has to do with the "energy
cr i sis" and the nat i 0 nls ener gy pol i ci es . 0ne mig ht •
therefore. naturally seek to understand the possible
relationship between this topic and the oil industry's
interest in the law of the sea. When the layman thinks
of U.S. oil sources offshore. the most readily imagined
are Alaska. California. or the Gulf of Mexico in the
U.S .• and the OPEC nations on the foreign front.
Indonesia and the North Sea are being much talked about
as areas of major new free world development.
Basically. offshore sediments are more productive
than onshore because of their younger. more loosely
packed geologic structure. This facilitates drilling.
Secondly. offshore is the major area where large oil and
gas reserves are yet to be discovered. Setting aside the
present economics of the "energy crisis". and looking
purely at the amounts of proven reserves in existence
worldwide. it becomes apparent that there is no shortage
of'oil. The "energy crisis" is political and economic.
The U.S. in its history of oil envolvement has changed
o
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from an oil exporting nat t onvt;o an:oil impo'r:ti'"1J
nation. Our dependence upon'foreign :oilisin:cr:e,asoin:g.•
This is then the matter of pr t mary rconcern .t.o £v£r-y
individual involved in any.a s pec t i of determinTrrg
u.s. energy policy or in supplying:theU.=S. wi:th
sufficient amounts of petroleum~to meet :flItur:e energy
requirements. liThe Arab countries of the Middle East
and N. Africa together with Iran now produce nearly
two thi rds of the oi 1 in wor1 d trade. .Even more
importantly, they possess some three-fourths ~f
the total world reserves outside the communist
countries." 19
The following facts and figures will provide
a better understanding of the trends and concerns
which characterize today's free world oil market.
About 60 percent of Western Europe's energy
is suppl ied by oil, of which over 3/4 of the
nearly 14 million barrels used per day
come from the Middle East and North Africa.
The proportion of energy supplied by oil
will probably rise to about 70 percent by
1980. representing an oil consumption of
some 23 million barrels per day. Over
70 percent of Japan's energy requirements
is now supplied by oil, 4.5 million barrels
per day, of which some 90 percent comes from
the Middle East. Japanese dependence on
Middle Eastern supplies will continue to
increase as its consumption rj~es to 13
million barrels~daily by 1980.
o
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As of now, this country draws 55 percent
of its total oil imports, equivalent to
about 11 percent of u.s. oil consumpt~?n,
from OPEC members, notably Venezuela.
M.A. Wright, board chairman of Humble Oil,
Jersey Standard's (Exxon) domestic sub-
sidiary, predicted that by 1985 the U.S.
will be dependent on foreign supplies for
more than 60 percent of its oil. Most
of that •.• will have 220 come from theEastern Hemisphere.
Most oilmen figure that U.S. shale will not
be converted to liquid petroleum in large
quantity unless oil prices rise at least
$4.00 per barrel, and perhaps $5.00
(at the Texas wellhead, a bar231 of oiltoday sells for about $3.40).
Even if large quantities of oil from the
Alaskan North Slope reach consumers by
1975, there will st"ill be a large ga~
between U.S. output and consumption. 4
Europe and Japan have little hope of
escaping from dependency on imported
oil. OPEC members already supply 85 percent
of Europe's oil. The anticipated production
of North Sea o t 1 by 1975 wi 11 cover about
one year's increase in European demand,
which rose by 13 percent in 1970. Until
more Indonesian fields are developed, Japan 25
must continue to depend on the Persian Gulf •..
The costs involved in the production of oil in
OPEC nations are 1) cost of "physically producing a
barrel of oil and delivering it to the point of export"
and 2) " ••. the export costs of this oil which includes
payments to the government by the producing company".26
(- ..'~,~,
12
Middle East and Persian Gulf oil: costs' less .tban
$0.20 per barrel to produce and N. African:oil
'27
costs less than $0.30 per bar.re l: t o: pro duee .'
From 1955 through 1970 payments' to:t~e m~jor)oil
producing countries (OPEC) varied between~$0:Z6
and $0.86 per barrel. In 1970 as aresult:of~a
settlement in Libya, this price increased $0.10 per
barrel throughout the Middle East. -Then in 1971
new negotiations with OPEC resulted ina further
increase in payments by U.S. oil concessionaires
of $0.30 per barrel with the provision for further
esc a1at ion to $0•50 per barr e1 by 1975• As are s uIt
of these renegotiations upward, the State Departmen~
has estimated~annu~l payments to oil producing nations
will rise from $5.9 billion in 1970 to $26 billion
in 1975. This added strain on an already balance
of payments deficit situation poses a most serious
problem for U:S. interests.
During the 1950's Middle East producers operated
on the 50/50 principle whereby they received 50 percent
of the net profit on oil at the export point after the
costs of the producing compan~had been deducted. In
o
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1960 the OPEC nations began to build their organization
into today what is the strongest of international
cartels. In 1965 OPEC introduced the concept of
"expensing of royalty" whereby royalty was treated as a
fixed cost of production and, therefore, deducted from
gross income. The result of this move was to increase
the payments to the producing governments by the
concessionaires by one-half the amount of the royalty
payments. This concept was introduced on a graduated
basis and not until 1975 would the full royalty be
deducted. In 1970 Libya forced an increase in the
basic tax rate to 55 percent. In January 1972 the
Persian Gulf countries forced an increase of 8.49
percent on the posted price of crude as compensation
the devaluation of the U.S. dollar - the dollar is
the basic unit of currency for all crude prices .
. Further, the principle of "participation" has been
accepted by the concessionaires in the Persian Gulf
as of March 1972. The specifics of such agreements
vary with each country, however, all allow the pro-
ducing company's operation to remain within the pro-
ducing country's boundaries, but the latter's~peecefttage
of ownership in the operation is to increase to a
..
o( '\<.
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controll i ng 51 percent wi th in. the's pace: of 'next ':f~.w
years.
U.s. oil companies have in the: past .conduc.ted
almost all of their own marketing:foroil,produc:-et:J
ab road.
. .• in recent months OPEC has advtsed its
members to insist that the companies .corrtt nue
to perform this function, not only becaus~
the companies have the facilities to do so,
but also because the tax-paid cost plus a
nominal return to the companies sets a pri~e
below which they cannot sell oil and remain
in business. Government companies, on the
othe r hand , i f r eli eve d 0 f t axes, the 0 ret i call y
have no lower limit on price above the
actual cost of production, a level which
would be disasterous to government revenues
should cut-throat co~~etition even begin tn
approach this floor.
Additionally, the consuming nations do almost all of
their own refining. Cheaper shipping rates on crude
have resulted from increased tanker sizes. These are
two reasons why U.S. oil companies are interested in
maintaining their marketing function.
OPEC serves in a very vivid way to dramatize U.S.
security of investment problems abroad. U.S. oil interests
in the law of the sea serve in a very vivid way to
express our sincere desire for resolution to problems'
of security of investment. Dependence upon Eastern
15
Hemisphere sources is increasing. No Anerican
likes to think of the day U.S. oil power and, hence,
industrial might may be so heavily dependent upon
another nation or group of nations. M.A. Adelman,
M.I.T. oil economist,states the following.
Depletion of reserves at the Persian Gulf
is only about 1.5 percent a year. It is
uneconomic to turn over an.l inventory so
slowly. But Persian Gulf operations have
not been free to expand output and displace
higher cost production from other areas
because this would wreck the world price
structure. Therefore, it is meaningless
to average production-reserve ratios for the
whole world, as is too often done. A
barrel of reserves found and developed
elsewhere in .the world is from 5-7 times
as important in terms of productive
capacity as a barrel at the the Persian
Gulf. In other words, one could displace
production from the entire Persian Gulf
with reserves from one-fifth to one-
seventh as large. And this is perhaps the
only constructive aspect of ~§e current drive
for self-sufficiency in oil.
The U.S. oil interests in the Law of the Sea represent,
in this author's view, precisely this desire for
"self-sufficiency" which the above quote addresses.
It is no secret that efforts in the North Sea, aside
from it being a desireable area for oil in terms of
reduced transportation costs to Europe, are politically
motivated. M.B. Morris, vice-president for Eastern
16
Hemisphere pe t ro l eun rexp t or-a.t tnn., Lnntinental Oil
Company, equat es i th e r o t l .ccns umtrrq :CDJJntr'y's prox-
imity to crude- oil :sources with .p.oli tt ca l stability.
In specific. hecites<:",theatt-rac:tivene.ss of the North
30Sea over the Middle~East -for £ur_op:e's crude supply.
The argument appl i es as well -to thee u.s. and Alaska.
Perhaps this explains in part why with only an est-
imated 12 billion barrels involved in the North Slope.
U.S. companies have already paid over $2 billion towards
its development~l-Twelvebillion barrels contrasts markedly
with 342 billio~ barrels of reserves for the Middle East. 32
In the years ahead producing nations will increase
their technological capabilities to produce oil and
thus become less dependent upon U.S. capital. They will.
however. before they reach total independence increase
their ownership in U.S. operated concessions on their
soil. Just how long the U.S. will remain in the pro-
duction end of the business in these foreign countries'
will determine how rapidly the face of the U.S. oil
industry will change. Behind all this conjecture lies
the over-riding concern as to how long OPEC power will
reign supreme.
oo
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Professor Adelman considers the U.S. policies
of the past to be responsible for OPEC's rise to power.
Without active support from the U.S,
OPEC might never have achieved much.
When the first Libyan cutbacks were decreed,
in May 1970, the u.s. could have easily
convened the oil companies to work out
an insurance scheme whereby any single
company forced to shut down would have
crude oil supplied by others at tax-plus
cost from another source. Had that been
done, all companies might have been shut
down, and the Libyan government would have
lost all production income. It would have
been helpful but not necessary to freeze
deposits abroad. The OPEC nations were
unprepared for conflict. Their unity would
have been 33verely tested and probably
destroyed.
We have already seen that the Libyan demands were met,
and OPEC emerged victorious. The situation currently
is that crude oil prices can go much higher before
they reach the monopolistic equilibrium point of greatest
profit. Again in Adelman's words, "The producing
countries have had great success using the weapon of
a threatened concerted stoppage and they can not be
expected to put it away".34
For the oil companies facing nationalization, oil
expert, Walter Levy, observes that their big decision
"is to what extent and for how long they can be held
oo
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hostage by their resource interests in producing
countries. Will they be able to moderate the ransom,
. 35
or would it be better to abandon the hostage?"
What can the oil companies do? Levy offers the
following suggestion.
Therefore, it has to be at least considered
whether the ultimate riposte of the industry -
faced with impossible demands and backed by
consuming countries -- may be to turn away
from their reserves and reappear as com-
petitive buyers of crude from the producing
countries. From the company standpoint,
its purchasing power would derive from
past investment in and current control
over transport, refining and marketing
facilities -- the power to dispose. And
they could expect that producing countries
eventually would compete for export volume
since captive concession-holding companies
would no longer be at their behest. For
established major oil companies, the crux
would be the loss of control over reserves.
Downstream position, historically, has been
related to preeminance in the resource position.
If that is replaced by a bargaining situation,
with all buyers haggling over crude price
advantage, it is doubtful that refining
and marketing shares will remain as is. While
efficiency in refining and marketing could
begin to count, the companies will probably
still prefer to hold on to the competition
edge of 'low-cost' reserves as long as
possible, no matter how high the produ~;ng
governments may push up that low cost.3~
Similarly, Adelman says the following.
Were the producing nations the sellers of crude.
paying the companies in cash or oil for their
services, the cartel would crumble. The floor
to price would ~~en be not the tax-plus-cost, but
only bare cost.
o
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And like levy. Adelman offers reasons why-U'::S.tIolb;y
and U.S. oil companies do not oppose.O~EC.
1) First. American companies have :a Ta-r:;ge
producing interest in: the world mark:e:t.
2) Second, the higherenergy:costs wiTl
now be imposed on competitors in. world
markets; and in petrochemic~ls htg~~r
raw material costs as well.
3) Third, the U.S. has a large domestic oil
producing industry. The less the difference
between domestic and world prices, the les~
the tension between producing and consuming
regions.
4) Fourth, the U.S. desires to appea~e ~he
producing nations, buying popularity with
someone else's money and trying to mitigate
the tensi~B caused by the Arab-Israel
strife .•.
In a 1972 Congressional report entitled.The U.S.
and the Persian Gulf. the following economic poli~y
in the Persian Gulf was recommended. (See Appendix C
for a U.S. petroleum supply and demand figures upon which
this report is based.)
1) U.S. relations with the states of the
Persian Gulf should continue to be practical
and low key.
2) While U.S. oil companies do need the support
of the U.S. Government in their dealings with
oil producing countries at this time of difficult.
o\ ...........
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Algeria
1967 Arab-Israil i Six Day War--- -natton-
alized U.S. oiLcompanies: ARCO.,
Mobil, and Jersey Standard. 'Settleme-rr:ts
were reached 1970~71.
Bolivia
1969 Gulf Oil Company expropriated.
Settlement reached 1971.
Ecuador
1972 Texaco-Gulf consortium working
on Trans-Andean pipeline is presently
threatened with contract alteration
due to possible military coup d'etat.
Iraq
1961 Iraq Petroleum Company (owned in
part by Standard of New Jersey and . .
Mobil) seized. Settlement not reached,
precipitated further seizures in 1972.
1972 Iraq and Syria further nationalized
IPC assets on June 1. ~Settlemerrt
announced in NY Times ~ebruary 28,
1973. IPC will pay Iraq $610 million
in return for Iraq guarantee that oil
will be4Belivered to Mediterranean
ports. )
Libya -~ Government leadership figures strongly
in OPEC tax increases.
1969 Chappaqua Oil Company seized. Settlement
unknown.
1970 Gulf Oil seized. Standard of New
Jersey nationalized.
From the foregoing summary, it will be seen that
expropriations are proceeding at an accelerated
rate and that a great variety of industries,
as well as oil, are affected (the author has:
mentioned only oil expropriations from Mr.
Leigh's article). The examples summarized
illustrate nearly all of the issues that arise
in the law of expropriati~ns. There have been
. I
oo
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politically motivated expropriations. as in
the Algerian seizures in 1967 and in Libya
in 1972. In most cases. expropriation has
been in violation of existing concession
agreements. In some cases. compensation has
been offered and accepted in full settlement.
In two countries. Peru and Chile, where com-
pensation has been offered,bizarre offsets
have been claimed, which greatly exceed the
amount of the claims for compensation. In
none of these cases, as far as I am aware,
has arbitration been instituted. User
recourse t04fhe courts has been expressly
disallowed.
Adelman has suggested a purely economic solution
to OPEC power, and both Adelman and Levy have offered
reasons why this will practically never occur. Classical
economics describ~ the interrelated forces that govern
the marketplace, and then always adds the postscript that
these forces apply under conditions of perfect competition.
Perfect competition. of course, is rarely seen in the
real world. In the international oil market perfect
competition will not occur before certain political
decisions are made. Notably, the political decision on
the part of the consuming governments to seek a more
active role in this market is needed to stimulate any
economic changes. Levy addresses this point when he
speaks of consuming nation security of supply..
o0
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A more effective relationship with :the
,industry is essential to. the l onqe r--nun
interests of all consuming. countries.
Their governments h.ave already indicated
that they intend to involve themselves
with many aspects of company operations
within their countries, including:the
relationship among industry·s costs :taxes,
prices, and profits. An example is :the
new Common Market policy to obtain
information regularly on the oil ..
industry's supply and in'lestment programs:4:2
This aut h0 r i s not s uggest i ng t hat inc rea sed g0 vern me nt roo le
in the oil industry is the answer, for what may benefi-t
foreign investment may not benefit domestic lftvestmerrt.
We have, in fact, seen that present policies abroad.
complement the domestic policies of the U.S. oil industry.
This author is suggesting that the situation from both
industry's and government's view is one in which any
course of action will have its good and bad points.
In large bureacracies decisio~with these results are th~
norm. Realizing the situation is too complex for one
solution then, decision-makers devote their energies
to more narrowly defined problems which,assuming a
favorable resolution, will ultimately have some good effec~
upon the larger problem. The above mentioned goal of
government and industry establishing a more effective
oc
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relationship is a reasonable goal -- one to which
many decision-makers in the energy business are devoting
a great deal of effort. In recent years the law of
the sea has become a central forum for just this process.
Additionally. U.S. interests have had the benefit of
international scrutiny as this development has been
housed largely in the United Nations. The law of the
sea will not solve OPEC power, but for the remainder
of this discussion we shall look at how it may well
pr6vide the U.S. oil interests with a significantly
larger measure of control over the problem.
'.
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The Search for Solution
The U.S. has been the leading nation in offshore
development of petrn1eum resources. C. Eichelberger,
executive director, Commission to study the Organization
of Peace, has in his article, liThe United Nations and the
Bed of the Sea", outlined the development of inter-
national interests in the seabed during this period
when the oil industry has moved offshore. 43 In 1957
the Commission recommended that the UN General Assembly
declare the seabed beyond the continental shelf to be
the property of the international community. On July
13, 1966 President Johnson made the following statement.
We must ensure that the deep seas and the
ocean bottoms are and remain, the legacy of
all human beings.
In 1967 the UN Committee of the World Peace Through Law
Center recommended that the General Assembly claim
jurisdiction of the seabed beyond the continental shelf.
Also, in 1967 the ambassador from Malta in the UN, Dr.
Arvid Pardo, proposed that the UN declare the "seabed
and the ocean floor underlying the seas outside present
territorial waters and/cir the continental shelves" to be
the common heritage of mankind. 44
The U.S. via the Truman Proclamation of 1945
unilaterally claimed exclusive jurisdiction over its
'.
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continental shelf. In 1958 the UN Conference in Geneva
adopted the Convention on the Continental Shelf:
Article I in part reads as follows.
For the purpose of these articles, the
term 'continental shelf' is used referring
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea,
to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas; (b)
to the seabed and subsoil of similar
submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
islands. 45
The 1969 North Seas Continental Shelf Cases are cited
as being supportive of the above quoted Article I as
codification of customary international law.
In view of the special treatment accorded
Articles I through III of the Convention
by the Court, a sound argument can be made
that tRey ... evidence customary international
law.~~46
More importantly, the World Court recognized
that the doctrine of the continental shelf
constituted customary international law
exclusive of th~ Convention on the Con-
ti nental Shel f. 7
Thus, it was in 1967 Ambassador Pardo's initiative
served to polarize these two developing~ yet conflicting,
views of what should be done with the seabeds. Pardo's
statement resulted in the establishment of a 35 member
'.-
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Ad Hoc Committee tasked with "Examination of the question
of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes
of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits
of present national jurisdiction, and the uses of their
resources in the interests of mankind~'. The following
year this Committee was established as a standing
committee, and is commonly referred to as the Seabeds
Committee. Its membership has since increased to over
90 members.
The Commission to study the Organization of Peace in
1969 recommended that the 1958 Continental Shelf Con-
vention be revised to limit the national exploitation
rights to 200 meters or 50 nautical miles. The U.S.
Presidential Commission on Marine Science, Engineering
and Resources also in 1969 supported 200 meters or
50 nautical miles. The Commission further proposed
the creation of an intermediate zone seaward of the
limits of national jurisdiction and extending to 2500
meters or 100 nautical miles. Only the coastal state
or its licensees should be authorized to explore or
exploit in this zone. Seaward of the intermediate zone
would lie the deep seabed to be controlled by an
()
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i nt ern at ion a1 aut h0 r i ty .
The National Pe t r ol e umDoun c t l (NRC)i-n -its T91i9
report, Petrol eum Resources Under the -Ocean Fl-o.or,
reviewed the UN Resolutions- and-the Marine :S:chm:c=.e
Commission's recommendations. As anofftci:al vnt.ce'--s
for U.S. oil interests, NPC recommended .that th-e U.S-.
not concede its right~ granted under existing treaties
and i nt ern at ionall aw, tot he exp10 ita t ion o-f i ts
resources on the continental shelf.
On May 23, 1970 President Nixon announced a major
U.S. policy decision on the oceans. 48 National jurisdic-
tion of the seabed should be limited to 200 meters.
Similar to the Marine Science Commission proposal, the
President proposed the establishment of a trusteeship
zone between the 200 meter and 2500 meter isobaths.
The President further proposed the establishment of an
international authority to control the deep seabeds
beyond 2500 meters. The NPC was asked to respond to this
s tateme nt • I n 1971 anN PC SupP1eme nt tothe 1969
report was published. The NPC position was the same as
that stated in 1969; the NPC opposed relinquish-g exist-
ing rights. The NPC did, however, agree with 5 specific
points in the President~s statement.
-,
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••• 1) the collection of substantial mineral
royalties to be used for international
community purposes, particularly economic
assistance to developing countries .•. and
the establishment of general rules, 2)
to prevent unreasonable interference with
other uses of the ocean, 3) to protect the
ocean from pollution, 4) to assure the
integrity of the investment necessary for
such exploitation, and 5) to provide for
peaceful ~~d compulsory settlement of
disputes.
The 1974 Law of the Sea Conference will address
a wide range of issues. One of them will be the question
of an international seabeds regime. One invites a certain
amount of discord among law of the sea interest groups,
if one seeks to arrange the issues in some hierarchy
based upon importance. Fisheries, for instance, would
oppose any inferences that their concerns are subsidiary
to petroleum, and vice-versa. In a less provocative
sense, however, it can prove enlightening, if not
essential, to discuss various factions representing
views on the seabeds proposals and the relationships
which some of these views may bear to other issues
to be discussed. U.S. policy in the law of the sea
breaks down into two broadly defined areas, 1) the
seabed - how it will be divided between coastal state
and international authority, and 2) territorial seas,
'.
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straits, and fisheries. 50
Dr. Ann Holl ick in an a r t icl e- entitled "Seabeds
Make Strange Politics" provides a very insightf~l
view as to the t nt er e r-e l a t ions ht.p s of- tbe various
ocean issues, and U.S. policy evolution. With'r:egar:d
to oil interests, for example, Dr. Hollick states
the 'following.
As the ocean interests of the petroleum
industry have become more diverse, a single
policy has been increasingly difficult to
elaborate. Whereas the domestic s ect or s vof
the major petroleum companies formerly con-
trolled ocean policy in cooperation with th~
Interior Department and its National Petroleum
Council, international segments of the industry
with close relations to the Department of
State, are playing an~increasing role. 51
Or, with regard to the evolution of U.S. ocean policy
since President Nixon's 1970 statement, Dr. Hollick
states the following.
In the last two years, U.S. policy has
shifted away from insistence that nationaljurisdiction be limited to the 200 meter
isobath; increas~ngly, the United States is
responding to strong international and
domestic pressure in favor of a broader
resource or economic zone. The government
now simply delineates the provisions that
must apply in undefined coastal zones of
national resource jurisdiction. In such
areas. the United States insists~on inter-
national agreement to certain standards
and provisions for compulsory dispute
settlement to protect other uses of the area
and to safeguard the integrity of investments. 52
o
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This comment shall become central to the remainder of
this discussion and will be discussed in much further
detail.
We mentioned related issues - territorial seas,
straits, and fisheries. Generally, in these areas
U.S. policy has moved toward more coastal state juris-
diction. There is, for example, considerable support
now for a 12 mile territorial sea if free transit of
international straits can be assurred. In the February
2, 1973 edition of Ocean Science News, editor Hull
refers to something "closely approaching 'free transit'
through straits - a two-tier approach, perhaps, with
certain historical international straits (Gibralter,
English Channel, for example) providing for completely
free transit, and others of more recent commercial and
military interest being sUbject to rules amounting to
something less than 'free transit' - more along the
lines of innocent passage".53 The change in fisheries
has been towards "acceptance of coastal state management
of coastal and anadromous species of fish".5~
United States seabeds policy has two major aspects,
"1) delimitation of national jurisdicti.on over seabed
minerals, and 2) nature of the seabed regime to be
'.
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established beyond national jurjsdjctjon~~55
The first concerns the oil industry'because'tt'ts
within the continental margins that most:6f:t~e
oil lies. The second is of prt me rc once rn rt o -na-r:d
minerals industries for the deep seabed:contai'ns
the manganese nodules. The posit jon of-the :Dep,a-r:t-
ment of Defense has been that it favors free
transit of straits, freedom of navigation on th.e
high seas, and a narrow interpretation of nation~l
jurisdiction on the continental shelf-The i nte re.sts
of pure scientific research i.e. research for the sake
of knowledge vice economic or military gain favor a
narrow shelf. The Department of Interior, the American
Bar Association, the NPC, the American Branch of the
International Law Association, and the oil companies
traditionally have supported a wide shelf interpreta-
t t 5610n.
In an interview with M.S. McKnight, general counce l ,
NPC, the preceding remarks by Dr. Hollick concerning the
shift away from the trusteeship zone and towards the
economic zone were similarly expressed~6AAt the 1972
New Delhi meeting of the Asian-African Legal Committee
19 nations endorsed the concept of a 200 mile economic
r>\ ",;
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zone of exclusive jurisdiction by coastal states of
seabed mineral resources. Thus, there appears to
be an emerging acceptance of the 200 mile economic zone •
. The roots of this concept, of course, go back to 1952
with the Latin American Declaration of Santiago. J.R.
Stevenson, U.S. ambassador to the Seabeds Committee, on
August 10, 1972 made a significant statement in this
regard. He expressed the willingness on the part of
the U.S. government to accept a broad resource manage-
ment zone under the exclusive purvue of the coastal
state provided internationally agreed upon standards
were therein applied in 5 specific areas. These
5 areas are the same 5 points mentioned in the 1971
NPC Suppl ement, and wi 11 be di scussed mo r e fully' 1ater in the . ,
chapter. Oil interests, thus cast in an arena with many
other law of the sea issues appear on the surface and for
the moment to be well represented in current law of the
sea negotiations.
R. Wright and L. S. Ratiner, then chairman of the
Department of Defense Advisory Group on the Law of the
Sea, summarize the progress of the law of the sea neg-
otiations from oil industry's viewpoint as follows;
0· ·".
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... the s tar ting ~ pos t t ion s :of .some 1) f "the
principal countries in the negotiation have
begun to evol ve in t he i cour s e of general
debate t n the Plenary rather:than in an'y
of the Subcommittees. Whenth£ l~w -of thE
Sea Conference fi rst appeared on "the
horizon, the range of vi able e l te rnattves
included the Latin American ~200miTE
territorial sea pos tt ion as well as t ne more
traditional ,.customary t nt ern e-t torral Taw
positions, Today,"based on the thE
Declaration of Santo Domingo, the re.sul t s
of the Yaounde Seminar and the U.S. August
10 speech, as well as numerous other
important policy statements in the Plenary~
it is obvious that the gulf between widely
disparate positions has begun to close.57
The August 10 speech emphasized that U.S. mineral
resource interests were not an issue to be traded
away for benefits in another area.
The views of my delegation on resource
issues have also been stated on a number of
occasions. Unfortunately, some delegations
appear to have the impression that maritime
countries in general, and the United States
in particular, can be expected to sacrifice
in these negotiations basic elements of their
national policy on resources. This is not
true. The reality is that every nation
represented here has basic interests in both
resource and ng~-resource uses that require
accommodation.
When the trusteeship zone was being more seriously
considered a couple of years ago, H. G. Knight made the
following points in its favor.
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1) International Seabed Area disposition
provisions:are developmentally oriented •
... they provide almost unlimited exploration
rights and permit extremely large areas
to be retained for exploitation purposes
until commercial production is achieved.
2) ... industry will be protected as never
before from the threat of expropriation
without payment or compensation.
3) As Elliot Richardson, then Under
Secretary of State, said, "c l e ar rules
of the game ... for rights of exploration
off the coasts of other countries would
exist.
4) Industry won1t have to negotiate directly
with foreign government, it will have the
International Authority.59
Have there been any trade-offs in the shift in po~ition?
With regard to point number one, exclusive jurisdiction
for mineral resource development will facilitate devel-
opment at rates comensurate with the abilities and
interests of each coastal state. That is to say, a nation
mayor may not opt for a developmentally oriented
stance. In either case, however, it seems certain that
the "almost unlimited" rights will have been up-graded
to unlimited rights. With regard to the remaining
three points, the logical concern from the point of
view of a U.S. oil company might well be that if the
economic zone will serve U.S. domestic offshore interests
so well, then surely it wi 11 do the same for the
.-
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the i nt ere s t s 0 f forei gn coas tal ~ s tatest n :t Ile;--1'
offshore domains.
Mr. Knight's latter three points -addne ss :tlre
very real prob1 em of investment securi ty whtch _U.ss..
oil companies presently encounter in foreign .ope rat tons.•
The problem is not universal; there are 'climates where
political stability enable security of U.S. investment.
Areas such as the North Sea, Canada, and, more recently,
Russia offer attractive climates for U.S. investment. 6D
In the less stabJ~ political spheres of the world, -the
three proposals by Mr. Knight certainly appeQn to be
beneficial to oil interests. The t r us tee s hi pz 0 ne
concept was cast within a more pronounced international
framework than law of the sea discussions have permitted
since the May 1970 proposal. The economic zone is very
heavily weighted to the national point of view. It seems,
given the present predominance of nation-state vice
international communities, that if remedy to Mr. Knight's
concerns were to be achieved, it might more easily be
facilitated by changing an existing structure than by
going the longer way about and first instituting a new
framework and then introducing the change. A nation-
state oriented economic 1zone, if it can be modified
37
as per the August 10 speech by Ambassador Stevenson.
would seem to be a more readily achievable goal than
perhaps a new, untried, and more internationally
·f1avored approach.
With regard to lesser developed countries which
might offer an insecure environment to U.S. companies.
Wright and Ratiner make the following comment .
... treaty provisions which would protect
the integrity of investment should be of
interest to the developing countries as much
as they are to the developed. Developing
countries, to the extent they are suspect by .
major investors because of an expropriation.
frequently require a period of years in
order to regain investor confidence.
Willingness to accept a treaty obligation
to protect the integrity of investment
might substantially shorten that waiting
period and enhance many developing countries'
prospects for attracting oil investment.
There is another potential advantage
if the developing countries accept the concept
of 'integrity of investment '. We have seen
in the Seabeds Committee a reluctance on the
part of developed countries to accept the
principle of revenue sharing which has been
so vigorously promoted by the developing
countries. It is possible that developed
countries would be less reluctant to accept
revenue sharing if they could foresee tangible
benefits with respect to their foreign
investments accruing as a direct result of
their wi11ioaness to share revenues off their
own coasts.61
c.~1,
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Assume each nation establishes a 200 mile
economic zone for exclusive mineral rights to the
seabed off its coast. There will be little in the
·way of petroleum reserves that will not then be
subject to the control of one coastal state or
another. The fact that some coastal states' margins
are substantially less than 200 miles wide is
irrelevant from the jurisdiction viewpoint. Those
nations with a sUbstantially narrower shelf, however,
will probably have }~ss wealth in petroleum resources
offshore. Ironically, the Latin American nations,
which have for so long championed the 200 mile zone
of exclusive jurisdiction, may be in this very
situation. In accepting the 200 mile economic zone,
these nations may have foreclosed an opportunity to
have benefitted from a narrower zone in terms of their
exploitation off foreign coastal states with substan-
tially broader shelves. All this, of course, is pre-
dicated upon the assumption that 200 miles will be the
distance chosen for the economic zone -- it may in fact
not be.
/\
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For the U.S. oil companies,distance may -no.t .be
the prime consideration in acce pt i nq v t be .co ncept tof
the economic zone. Political stability probably "i;s
a more important concern. At the January"TgZ3 me.e~tin!J
of the American Society of Lnt er ne t t onal u.aw , 'P~an_~l
on the Law of the Sea ~ Eo Fi gueredo, foreignofftc:e.,
Venezuela expressed the view of his country that th£
economic zone must have a d~fined limit to start,
and then agreements can be made to obt.in within this
zone.61~ Such would be the case with the 5 points
contained in the August 10, 1972 speech of the U.S.
U.S. oil interests may gain more in terms of stability
and beneficial climate of investment with t~ese five
points applied to the zone than if the U.S. were to
concentrate more on establishing a seaward limit of
national jurisdiction on the seabed as per 1958
Conti nenta1 Shel f Conventi on or May 23, 1970 statement
by President Nixon. In accepting the 200 mile economic
zone, the U.S. is not saying that its rights terminate
at the 200 mile limit. U.S. oil interests may well
extend beyond this boundary. As this paper ;s being
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prepared, the economic zone is being discussed
and its concept is being further defined. There is
no concrete understanding as to what its relationship
with the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention will be~
Will the economic zone replace the Convention as
international law? .Clearly this depends upon how
many nations endorse the economic zone. It is too
early even to speculate. At present this author will
pursue a very conservative discussion of the implications
of this zone. The facts are these: 1) there appears to
be considerable support for the concept among lesser
developed nations, and 2) the United States will support
this zone with certain standards applied.therein. The
rights of nations in the seabed beyond the zone is not
clearly defined. Pending formation of an international
authority, the rights of exploitability would seem
to apply to the shelf beyond 200 miles. HR 9, currently
being considered, would establish interim mining rules
for the deep seabed. This legislation is not a claim
of exclusive rights to the deep seabeds by the U.S.
It is merely designed to facilitate investment where
U.S. technology is capable, but for political reasons
industry is discouraged.
0·:'..'
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A more detailed look at t he t f t ve r pot n.t.s .pr-op.osed
in the August 10,1972 statement t s va rs ub je.ct wh-i:ch
can be approached with more conc re t e r ana l ys ts .arrd "less
conjecture. The first of these:points, intern.ti»n~l
t rea ty s tanda rd s to pre ventun re as onab le i n:t~nferen:c.e
with other uses of the ocean, refers s pect'r tce lly
to "unreasonable interference with navigation, ov.er-
flight, and other uses". 62 According to J. Dykstr~,
U.S. representative to the Seabeds Committee meetings
in New York, the economic zone being discussed currently
will include the ocean floor and the water column
63
above. For purposes of our discussion, we have
limited this zone to the ocean floor mineral resources.
In making this limitation, however, one invites con-
sideration of the question of "creeping Jurisdiction".
Is such a phenomenon real? H. Gary Knight belies this
concept as juridically non-existent, but concedes it is
often a functional response to a perceived need by a
coastal state in it territorial sea. 64 It is then
to the eventualfiy of this latter situation that point
number one seems to address itself. Obviously 200
or,
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miles will entail considerable high seas in the
water column above. Freedom of navigation and
overflight must be preserved here.
If the next Law of the Sea Conference adopts
a twelve mile territorial seat some 116 international
straits whiGh now possess high seas would be theoretically
closed. It seems unlikely that the U.S. or any
other maritime nation could ever accept such a
situation. This author would t therefore t include this
as one item which must not be unreasonably inter-
fered with. (See Appendix D for a list of strategic
international straits.)
The key to this internationally agreed standard
will be what is reasonable. The test of reasonableness
has been applied in the past in interpreting the common
right of a nation to freedom on the high seas. The
test means that such freedom applies to uses which are
reasonable only. So too would this test of resonable-
ness be applied to the first point. Such interferences t
in other words t would only be permitted which are
reasonable. Such a reasonable test t for example t mi.ght
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be applied in the proposal for a deep water port.
Senator Tower (R-Tx) has introduced an
amendment to the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act providing authority Ifor
the issuance of permits to construct,
operate and maintain port and terminal
faci 1i ti es.' The bill, comments the
Senator, is required because of our
'urgent need for superports', The
Senator is pushing 6arAa deep water
terminal off Texas. -
The whole question of superstructures based on the
seabed which inhibit navigation is no where better
viewed than in the Gulf of Mexico. Presumably, similar
approaches to the fairways in the Gulf would have to
be applied in other navigation-seabed use conflicts
in order that the interests of all parties involved
be maximized to the extent possible.
The second point, international treaty standards
to protect the ocean from pollution, is probably the
most advanced in terms of international effort devoted
to the subject. The major concern of the u.S. oil
interests would be that the coastal state not be allowed
to interfere with freedom of navigation as a means
of controlling pollution. Such a situation may be seen
in the unilateral declaration by Canada in its Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1970. According
oc
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to T. Leitze11, attorney, Department- 6f~State,late£t
law of the sea developments sho~ ]esser-deY~loped
countries in coastal regions- favor: coastal: state .ccrrtro l
of poll ution in the economic: Z0J1.e~.E5 .Le t t ae l l -poses
six enforcement options: 1 ) flag s t et e v en f or-eemerrt ,
2) 1954 London Convention as amended ~lus:comp~lsory
settlement of disputes, 3) requirement of tanker
construction certification that a vessel meets inter-
national poll ution control requirements, 4) place -Ute
enforcement authority in the receiving port (perhaps
this could be implemented with an oil detection
device), 5) coastal state arrest and flag state
prosecution, or 6) 1954 London as amended i.e. coastal
66
state notification of flag state. G. Winn Haight,
New York attorney, observes that the coastal state
must adhere to standards of the international community.
Mr. Haight concedes that Canada's approach is right for
Canada, but that this approach must not be allowed -to
dominate pollution control. 67 When seen in terms of
a trade-off pollution occurring between 12 and
200 miles is much less of a priority issue than freedom
45
of navigation in that same zone. Mr. Haight suggests
further that some sort of interim agreement should be
reached such that coastal state and free navigation
interests retain the ability to remain on-going. 68
Pollution is a unique issue in the law of the sea
because,as mentioned earlier, so much work in this
area has already been accomplished by the international
community i.e. International Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO). According to Adm. J. Doyle some
of the lesser developed countries in their law of the
sea negotiations fail to recognize that much work has
been done by IMCO. 69While certain internationally
defined pollution control standards must be applied
to the economic zone, it should be realized that
pollution is not a phenomenon unique to the economic
zone and as such does not lend its complete resolution
to legislation strictly within the zone.
The third point is international treaty standards
to protect integrity of investment. This problem is
nowhere better dramatized than in recent Middle East,
.'
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OPEC, expropriations and nationalization activity.
It is precisely this kind of a situation which would
hopefully be avoided for U.S. investments in the
foreign offshore area. This issue is, in the ile\tflQf the
author, the key issue in all of the U.S. oil interests
in the law of the sea. The oil developers are moving
offshore; U.S. oil interests seek stabiltty in the
offshore environment. U.S. oil interests, eager to
invest in foreign offshore areas, are unwilling to
do so when conditions are so politically and
economically volatile.
The fourth point, sharing of revenue for the inter-
national community benefit, is one to which many agree
in principle. As Ambassador Stevenson observes, however, while
so much of this revenue would come from U.S. shelves
initially, "we are concerned about opposition to this
idea implicit in the position of those advocating an
exclusive economic zone".70 The advocates of the
economic zone are growing in numbers; generally, the
lesser developed nations of the Afro-Asian Community
and the latin American states support the zone. Will
these nations support international revenue sharing
oo
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or will they retain all revenues derived from within
their respective zones?
The fifth and final point is compulsory settlement
of disputes. This is the safety device required to handle
any misfire of U.S. investment abroad, and conversely,
of any foreign investment in the U.S. Presumably,
settlement would be handled in a manner similar to
the present International Court of Justice arrangement,
if not,ih fact, by the ICJ.
The affect of the August 10, 1972 statement was
not to alter the basic U.S. position, rather to shift
the focus. The U.S. has shifted from interests in the
law of the sea expressed in meters and miles to interests
expressed in internationally agreed upon standards.
This shift has occurred partly because of the U.S.
position of great power in the world. That is to say,
as a leading world power, the U.S. cannot afford to
become too dominant in a decision which by definition
is an international decision. Theoretically, the vote
of one lesser developed nation carries the same weight
as a vote from the U.S. Even though in reality the U.S.
oo
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accounts f~r 85 percent of all monies spent in the
oceans, th~ concept of one nation, one vote, still
obtains. In dealing with a Seabeds Committee with
over 90 members the U.S. cannot allow herself to be
negotiated out of any of her power. If the U.S. were
to dominate i.e. demand 85 percent of her policies
be adopted by the international community,
then the mission of all the lesser powers negotiating
wou1 d becoae that of voi ci ng thei r 15 percent of the
policy or more to the point diminishing the U.S.
percentage. These figures are not a qualitative
description of U.S. power, they merely illustrate the
point that the U.S. must not be too bullish with her
power lest it work to her disadvantage. Then the risk
of a break down in negotiations would become very
real. It is better, therefore, for us to remain less
in the forefront of the negotiating process so as to
allow an interplay of forces independent of the U.S.
among the less powerful. It works, for example, to
our advantage to have the CEP nations, long a trouble-
some group with tuna fisherman from U.S., to now be
confronted with a 200 mile economic zone worldwide,
C'·"·'. ;v
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and the resultant prospect of some foregone opportunity
to the CEP nations because of it. The example may
or may not be valid, but the point here is that this
kind of process evolved without dominant U.S. involve-
ment in the negotiations, and subsequently the U.S.
cannot be targeted as a scapegoat,as she has been ~
in the past,by a "have-not" nation. In the opinion
of J. Dykstra, the U.S. will wait until all the other
coastal states have gone to 200 miles with the economic
zone, and then follow suit. In the meantime, with the
lesser developed nations dominating much of the law of
sea discussion, it is reasonable for the U.S. to strongly
support these five points, and it is reasonable for the
Seabeds Committee to accept them.
o
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Chapter IV Conclusion
It would perhaps be instructive to view how
some of the OPEC nations consider the law of the sea
in regards to their petroleum resources offshore •
. Venezuela and Indonesia are the only OPEC nations
which signed the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf. They did so with "reservation or declaration".7l
In the closing days of the 1969 General Assembly in the
UN, the "moratorium resolution " to halt further develop-
ment of mineral resources of the seabed beyond the limit
of national jurisdiction was adopted by a vote of
62 in favor, 28 opposed, and 28 abstained. Among those
in favor were Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela.
Among those abstaining were Indonesia, Iran, Liberia,
Libya, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. opposed the resolution
on the grounds that it was meaningless under existing
international law i.e. limits of exploitability determine
limit of national jurisdiction. 72 Another resolution
passed in the 1969 General Assembly called for the
Secretary-General to prepare a further study of various
types of international machinery for governing the
international seabed. This resolution was supported by
oo
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Kuwait. Libya. and Liberia. 73 In the first Seabeds
Committee meeting 1971. a "large number of representa-
tives stated that the establishment of an international
.regime and machinery with comprehensive powers and
authority should be given priority in the Committee's
deliberations".74 This was supported by Algeria. Iran.
Iraq. and uibya. Kuwait supported a modified version
of the proposal which included simultaneous discussion
of the area of such a regime. The U.S. supported Kuwait's
view. At the end of the 1972 General Assembly. a resolution.
requesting the S~cretary-General to "prepare a com-
parative study of the extent and economic significance.
in terms of resources. of the international area that
would result from each of the proposals on limits
of national jurisdiction" for the seabeds. was
adopted by a vote of 69 in favor to 15 against with
15 abstentions. Voting against were Algeria and
Venezuela. Indonesia. Iran. and Saudi Arabia abstained. 75
The foregoing examples are not indicative of any
strong OPEC policy in the law of the sea. There is
no group unity to the extent that there is among the
Afro-Asian Community. for instance. There is not
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the emerging support for any major resource policy
that there is, for example, in the Latin American
nations with their "patrimonial sea". In 1971
the Indonesian states met to discuss ways to
establish regional controls for offshore exploration
and exploitation.
The notion of OPEC as an interest group in the
law of the sea is not well founded. U.S. oil companies
independently and in consortia negotiate for the rights
of offshore exploration and exploitation directly with
the various countries involved. This fact is evidenced
by reading the various annual reports of these oil
companies. They are not as concerned with the political
and legal overtones of the OPEC rise to power as they
with protecting their investments and making a profit~
To this extent none of the oil companies is anxious
to risk a short-run loss for the long-term gain. The oil
companies have to show a profit this year; their stock-
holders demand it. A short-run loss would surely result
if, for example, certain of the economic remedies mentioned
in Chapter II were applied.
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In conclusion u.s. oil interests in OPEC are
on-going and concerned with the present. They want
to know whether the latest devaluation of the dollar
.augurs another tax increase? . U.S. oil interests in
the law of the sea are equally as real, however, they
are more oriented to the future. U.S. oil interests
view the law offthe sea as a mechanism which if applied
to future offshore development will help stabilize
U.S. foreign investments considerably. There is time
yet. Offshore oil provides a small, but r epi dl y ,
increasing percentage of the total. There are a number
of politically stable offshore environments to be
exploited before the U.S. must meet face-to-face with
OPEC. There could be a couple decades yet before the
U.S. will have to actively begin to pro duce alternative
sources of energy (s h'a l e }. In the meantime if progress
can be made in the law of the sea negotiations, and
some sort of stable regime can be established in the
seabeds, all this will work to the oil companies ad-
vantage: Hopefully, the day when offshore development
moves seaward under the aegis of an internationally agreed
upon treaty is not in the too distant future.
· (--)
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Appendix A
List of Nations Involved in Offshore Activity:
Offshore production around the world
Cnu~trY,
Field
1971
prod.
Cum. Est
'·1·72 reserves
Million bbl ------.
Countr'y,
Field
1971
prod.
Cum. Est
1·1·72 reserves
Million bbl ---
Abu 'Dhabi
llrnm Shaif 36
Zakum .,................. 89
TOTAL............... 125
Anz:;la (Callinda)
73-480 0.1
72-4 , ,........ 14.0
73·1 8.0
73-2 6.0
72·9 2.0
72·18 0.2
72·73 3.0
72·35 2.0
84·l NA
843il .08
844 NA
84·4S 0.3
84·12 NA
73-48 0.08
72-34 NA
TOTAL............... 35.8
Argentina
Comodora Rivadavia 0.7
TOTAL 0.7
Austr<:lia
Bsrracouta 2.0
Barrow Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.0
Halibut 64.0
Kingiish 20.0
Marlin.,................. NA
TOiAL 102.0
8m::
Plataforma Continental SI
Dom roao 3.0
TOTAL............... 3.0
Brunei·ilia!aysia
Ampa SW. 29.0
Baram . 9.0
West Lctong 12.0
TOTAL............... 50.0
Congo (Brazzaville)
Emeraade Marine ......•... NA
TOiAL NA
284
257
542
0.06
31.0
21.0
17.0
3.0
0.06
3.0
2.0
NA
0.4
0.1
0.1
NA
0.05
NA
77.9
NA
NA
4.0
36.0
108.0
20.0
NA
'168.0
0.1
NA
.1
141.0
10.0
20.0
171.0
NA
NA
1,939
1,000
2,939
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1,200
NA
NA
498
155
536
930
500
2,669
NA
NA
NA
2,200
90
124
2,414
500
500
Denmark
"M" .. SI
Dubai
Fateh ...........••....... 46.0
Fateh, SW. SI
TOTAL............... 46.0
Egypt
Belayim* NA
EI Morgan 44.0
TOTAL.. 44.0
Gabon
Aguille 10.0
Port GentH Ocean ••..•••.• 1.0
Tchengue Ocean •••.••...• 0.5
TOTAL............... 11.5
Ghana
Block 10 SI
Iran
Bahrgansar 9.0
Hendijan .....•.•••••..... 2.0
Nowruz ••....•.•......... 7.0
Cyrus ........•..•....... 9.0
Darius* 37.0
Rostam ..........•..•.... 20.0
Rakhsh 3.0
Sassan ,.................. 130.0
TOTAL............... 217.0
Italy (Sicily)
Gela* 4.0
Japan
Kubiki 0.8
Lihya
Block 137 SI
Mexico
Arenque .......•......... 1.0
Atun 6.0
Cabo Nuevo 1.3
Isla de Lobos 2.0
Morsa .•......... .9
Santa Ana................ .6
Tiburon 1.0
TOTAL............... 12.8
SI
80.0
SI
80.0
225.0
247.0
472.0
36.0
7.0
4.0
47.0
SI
79.0
4.0
7.0
23.0
209.0
56.0
3.0
138.0
519.0
62.0
9.0
SI
.9
24.0
8.0
14.0
.5
27.7
3.0
78.1
NA
1,500
NA
NA
NA
400
NA
150
14
6
170
NA
960
450
960
790
1,123
980
560
1,318
7,141
90
15
NA
999
900
NA
20
NA
NA
21
NA
()
Source: J.C. McCaslin, "Worldwide Offshore Output Nears
9 Million B/D", The Oil and Gas Journal, May 1,1972, pp 197-198.
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Offshore production around the world (cont.)
1971
prod.
Cum. Est
1·1·72 reservel
~-- Million bbl ---
CoantrY,
Field
1971
prod.
Cum. Est
1·1·72 reserves
~-- Million bbl ----..
Country,
Field
NA = Not available.
SI = Shut-in (not producing),
* = Partly onshore.
**Boliver Coastal (30 billion bbl ultimate recovery).
5.0
30.0
NA
45.0
26.0
5.0
16.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
6.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
5.0
22.0
3.0
4.0
23.0
4.0
4.0
18.0
13.0
2.0
3.0
5.0
2.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
10.0
20.0
21.0
4.0
2.0
31.0
2.0
3.0
14.0
3.0
3.0
95.0
.7
.6
617.7
C.' Neutral ZoneHout ........••.........•Khafji _.. _. _ .
TOTAL .
New Zealand
Kapuni .....••..•.•.......
Nigeria
Delta .........• _•........
Delta, South .
Malu ...............•....
Meji ........•..... _ .
Meren ....•..............
Okan .
Para be ......•....•......
Asabo _.•.........
Idaho .
Ubit ............•......
Pennington ..
TOTAL .
Norvtay
Ekofisk .....•............
Ekofisk, West .
Tor .
TOTAL .
Peru
EPF·Belco _••....•..•.
Humboldt .
Litoral " •........
Providencia .
Rincon·37 ...•.•••••...•..
TOTAL ..
Qatar
Bul Hanine ..
Idd EI Shargi .
Maydan·Mahzan ••.........
TOTAL .
Saudi Arabia
Abu Sa'Fah" .
Berri* ........•..... . .•.
Manlfa* ......•••..•......
Qatif* ........••.•..•....
Safaniya* .
Khursaniya* .••••.•.......
TOTAL ..
Tobago.Trinidad
N. Marine ..
Soldado ..
Brighton* .
TOTAL .
Tunisia
Ashtart .
United Kingdom
Forties ....••..•..•.•...•
United States
Alaska
Granite Point .
McArthur River •...•....
Middle Ground Shoal .
Trading Bay ..
California
Alegria ..
Belmont Offshore .
Carpinteria .
Coal Oil Point .
Conception _ _ .
Cuarta _ ..
Dos Cuadras .••... . .•..
E:'::ood South .•.•.......
F~~~i~~'cn Be2Ch* .
p.;::~'J~ G~~shn!"e* _ .
r':'on:ai~o West* .
Santa Ynez .
Summerland Offshore .
Wilmington* .
Louisiana (giantsonlyl
Bay Marchand Blk. 2 ~
Breton Sound Blk. 20 .
West Delta 81k. 'lJ .
19.0 26.0
118.0 738.0
137.0 764.0
.7 .8
7.0 24.0
18.0 55.0
8.0 6.0
7.0 22.0
30.0 79.0
26.0 143.0
10.0 8.0
9.0 19.0
5.0 12.0
9.0 9.0
3.0 4.0
132.0 381.0
(began prod. late'711
(began prod. late '71)
(not producing)
.1 .4
5.0 19.0
2.0 20.0
2.0 9.0
NA .2
9.1 48.6
SI SI
17.0 108.0
65.0 249.0
82.0 357.0
30.0 130.0
57.0 85.0
2.0 79.0
35.0 326.0
289.0 1,882.0
27.0 344.0
440.0 2,846.0
OJ 1.0
23.0 218.0
OJ 62.0
23.2 281.0
SI SI
SI 81
6.0 40.0
41.0 135.0
11.0 59.0
9.0 32.0
0.1 0.2
3.0 32.0
5.0 33.0
0.1 1.0
0.4 28.0
0.1 0.6
28.0 51.0
.9 6.0
16.0 393.0
.8 2i.O
.0 3.0
SI SI
.9 24.0
49.0 643.0
31.0 335.0
2.0 21.0
1.0 13.0
950
800
1,750
10
101
200
104
95
448
445
105
102
65
104
65
1,834
1,500
NA
NA
7,000
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2,007
10,000
12,007
6,398
5,817
10,930
8,709
23,402
6,156
61,412
0.8
200
70
270.8
NA
1,500
91
191
126
74
0.5
55
82
1
45
0.9
125
15
108
2
.5
3,000
48
636
447
50
48
West Delta Blk. 30 .
West Delta Blk, 41 .
West Delta Sik. 73
West Delta Bli<. 105 .
West Delta Blk. 117 .
West Delta Blk. 133 .
Eugene Island 81k. 18 .
Eugene Island Blk. 32 .•....
Eugene EsJand 81k. 126 .
Eugene Island Blk. 128 .
Eugene Island 81k. 175 .
Eugene lslznd 81k. 188 .
Eugene Island Blk. 276 .
Grand Isle Blk. 16
Grand Isle Blk, 18
Grand Isle Blk. 41 ..
Grand Isle 61i<. 43 ..
Grand Isle 61k. 47 ..
Main Pass Blk. 35 .
Main Pass Blk. 41 .
Main Pass Elk. 69 .
Main Pass Blk. 299 .
S. Marsh Island Blk. 6 .
S. Marsh !sland Blk. 73
South Pelto Blk. 20 .
Rabbit Island .
Ship Shoal Blk. 107 .
Ship Shoal Blk. 113 .
Ship Shoal Blk. 154 .
Ship Shoal Blk. 176 .
Ship Shoal 81k. 204 .
Ship Shoal Blk. 207 .
Ship Shoal BI~. 208 .
South Pass Sik. 24 ..
South Pass Blk. 27 ..
South Pass Blk. 62
Tiger Shoal .
Timbalier Say .
South Timbalier Blk. 54 .
South Iirnbalier Blk. 131 .
South Timbalier Blk. 135 '"
South Tirnbalier Blk. 176 .
Vermilion Blk. 245 .
Others (215 fields) .
Texas
Federal Block 288 .
High Island .
TOTAL U.S .
Zaire '
GC·IX .. NA
Venezuela
Zulia State
Bachaquero" 270.0
Cabimas*" 30.0
Lagunillas** 343.0
Centro t;8.0
Ceuta 23.0
Lama.................. 117.0
Lamar 52.0
Mene Grande 4.0
Tia Juana* 135.0
TOTAL 1,023.0
U.s.S.R.
Azerbaijan
Ba khar (Makarov Bank) ..
Baku Archipelago
(Sangach~I~·DuvannyiBu"a)
Izerbash* .
Neftianye Kamni .
Turkmcn
Cheleken ~.O
TOTAL............... 81.0
TOTAL WORLDWIDE OFFSHORE 3,197.6
241.0
30.0
95.0
16.0
7.0
8.0
34.0
14.0
74.0
35.0
6.0
25.0
23.0
160.0
36.0
17.0
99.0
53.0
72.0
102.0
161.0
7.0
15.0
25.0
15.0
21.0
34.0
15.0
27.0
16.0
6.0
13.0
15.0
322.0
217.0
14.0
17.0
331.0
11.0
26.0
101.0
16.0
16.0
3,059.0
6.0
1.0
7,577.8
NA
4,184.0
1,186.0
7,723.0
244.0
174.0
1,566.0
459.0
558.0
2,573.0
18,767.0
7.0
100.0
20.0
715.0
5.0
847.0
34,095.3
157
34
625
13
10
12
12
13
50
2..
24
24
41
190
52
30
169
45
27
202
138
15
15
30
14
20
25
19
19
lr;
14
39
121
750
159
26
13
320
17
23
166
17
17
NA
50
40
NA
NA
**
*.
.*
500
450
1,112
1,300
32
1,401
NA
NA
90t
NA
500
10
NA
NA
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Appendix B
Geographic Location of Worldwide Offshore Reserves of
Petroleum and Gas:
Fig. 1
Where on the high seas in 1973
CGI
Source: J.C. McCaslin, "0ffshore Exploration Is Moving
Around the Globe ll , The Oil and Gas Journal, Dec 11, 1972. P 106.
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Indonesia
Fig. 3
The Indonesia offshore theater
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Source: J.C. McCaslin s "Offshore Exploration Is Moving
Around the Globe", The Oil and Gas Journal, Dec 11, 1972, p 107.
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WORLD (EXPLORATION') Table Showing Approximate Distance To 100
Fathom Line For Various Parts Of The World
.(cont'd)
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: 2. Bahrain 1.
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The Gulf is up to 18 nautical miles wide , .
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ofhiand ' . , . .
Walcr dcpth less than 40 fathoms . , . .
(a) Persian Gulf, less than SO fathoms
(b) Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea
Depth less than 30 fathoms
Depth less than 30 fathOl1ll
Gulf of Oman '
Depth less than SO fathoms
Rcd Sea Cout
Persian Gulf. about SO falboms deep, and about 120 nautiQl
miles wide . . .'
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.-
IS,
80
...- . ,~. ,.~.-
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,
, '..
Kuwait
Neutral Zono
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:- S.
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Norlll America, South AmerlctJ
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1.: Bahamu
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. .
..
,.
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"
".
o'
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7. Surinam
8. Trinidad
9. ,U.S.A.
. ,
.
2. ~ada·· . . :
,2
60
3
40
60
5 to 205
200 to 500
SO
SO to 100
10 to SO
about 1
20 to 60
1 to 30
. 130
30
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5 to 30
30 to 70
10
20 to 40
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45
10 to 30
60
5
110
40 to 100
50 to !30
120to iooo
(a)
(b)
(e)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(c)
(f)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(IIi
(c)
{f)
(s)
(h)
(i)
East of Andros Island
West of Andros Island
South of Grand Bahama Island
North of Grand Bahama Ialand
Atlantic Coast
Newfoundland Island gcnc:ral1)' about 20nautiQl miles
Hudson Bay
Pacinc Coast
Baffin Island, cast of North Coast ,
Prince Regen; Inlet (West Coast)
South of Sierra Maestra .
Between Cab Cruz and Sierra de rriniuad
Gulf dc Batabano,less than 100 fathoms deep. Widll\ about 70
nautical miles .
.North COO!!t of Cuba
on Pia BOllCOhuo
Off Tonala
Oli Pta. Roea Partida .
Most of it about 10 naulical miIci -
East boundaria
. North Coast
South Coast
Pacific Coa5t
Pacific Coast olfthe Stale or~~hinston
Atlantic Coast, pli Florida
Atlanlic Coast, orr Long Island
The rest or the Atlantic Coast line
Gulr of Mcxico
Beaufort Sea. off Alaska
Chukchi Sea, off Alaska
Gulf of Alaska, .off Alaska •
~. ', .
Gulf of Venezuela, Ieaa than 30 rathoms cIcep
., Solllll AmerlctJ .••.•,
1•. Argentina ..'
2. Brazil ;
. '3. Britisb Honduras
. 4. Chile :0.
S. Colombia·::';'·'
6. Ecuador
· 7. Peru
, 8. Venezuela
'....
60 to 3.50
20 to 30
100
10 to 60
100
IS
5 to 40
10 to 30
10 to 30
15 to 60
10 to 100
(a) North Coast
(b). In the vicinity or Pta Riwr
(c) East Coast
(d) In the Sao Paulo areA
: ~.' ~ .
'"i. , .
", ~:' "
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Source: Wiegel, 8th World Petroleum Conqress,1971.
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East China Sea
South China Sea
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West of Sumatra
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.., .
Asia
r.: I.' China
. 2. 'India
" .
...
Aus/ralianArea' .
1.: Australia
. ', ...
2. Borneo·'
3. New Zealand '.
15 to 120·
10 to 120
200
10 to 60
60 to 120
5 to 60
(a) South Coast, Bass Strait, less than 100 fathoms deep, .'
(b). East Coast
(c) North Coast '
(d) .West Coast •
. South China Sea
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Chapter I
Introduction
The maritime transportation industry is an extremely
important one for the United States today. Being deficient
in most of the materials considered "strategic", the U.S.
must import 69 of the 72 critical materials required by
our high technology industry (Day, 10 August 1973). These
strategic materials are mostly carried by ships; thus, our
economy, and to some extent our national defense, depend
on the secure and efficient operation of the maritime
transportation industry. Anything which could adversely
impact on the continued operation of shipping is a matter
of grave concern.
The importance of the merchant marine was clearly recog-
nized from the inception of the United States. One of the
first acts passed by the new Continental Congress concerned
the establishment of a merchant marine. In his report to
the Congress Thomas Jefferson, in 1793, wrote of the essen-
tial nature of secure maritime transportation. This govern-
mental interest in the merchant marine was shared by the
industry itself, and U.S. flag vessels sucessfully competed
with vessels flying other flags.
The ensuing two hundred years wreaked numerous changes
to the maritime industry. The U.S. Civil War, the Indust-
2rial Revolution, the change from sail to steam, and two
World Wars all greatly affected the industry. As the United
States progressed from an agrarian society to a highly indus-
trial one, our dependance on imported materials grew until
the present time. Viewing the figures in paragraph one, it
becomes very evident that the economic well being of this
nation rests, to a large extent, on the steady flow of
materials into this country. These raw materials are
then transformed by industry into finished products,
many of which are exported. Shipping then takes these
exports to the rest of the world. It has been estimated
that exports account for 20 percent of domestic U.S. jobs.
Therefore, shipping is a necessity for the economic
health of this country.
With foreign trade being as critical as it is, it
stands to reason that the U.S. would have a large, domes-
tic-flag fleet of merchant ships capable of moving the
vast tonnages required by its economy. However, due to
a variety of economic circumstances, this is not the
case. In fact, domestic flag vessels carry only 5 percent by
weight, and 28 percent by value of our foreign trade
(U.S. Dept. Commerce, August, 1981, p. 2).
While in peacetime, there are many foreign flag mer-
chant vessels ready and able to carry what ever tonnages
U.S. flag vessels cannot carry, this situation could
change radically in the event of a war or national emer-
gency.
3Many foreign flag vessels are government owned or
subsidized and, as such, are very dependant and respons-
ive to the political philosophy of their governments.
Even foreign vessels not directly owned or subsidized by
their governments must follow the dictates of their
governments, in order to avoid puntative measures in
licencing, registration, etc. If these governments
politically support the U.S., then trade will probably
continue as usual. However, if these governments do not
support the U.S., or if, due to wartime circumstances,
there is an added risk to the vessels themselves or to the
governments involved, then there might be an interruption
in the flow of resources, both into and out of the U.S.
Such an interruption, depending on its scope and duration,
could cause severe economic damage to the United States.
Since a strong economy is essential to the national defense,
such an interruption in trade would weaken this nation's
defenses. If domestic flag vessels are not able to respond
adequately in this situation, the U.S. could be damaged,
both economically and militarily. To avoid this damage,
the number of U.S. flag vessels would have to be increased
to carry the tonnages not being carried by foreign flag
vessels. Depending on the speed with which additional
domestic flag vessels could be pressed into service, the
economy could experience shortages in vital materials, and
therefore damage. At the present time, U.S. flag vessels
would find it extremely difficult to respond to such a
4situation in a manner timely enough to prevent shortages
from occurring.
Up to this point, only general transportation has
been discussed. However, in addition to routine trade,
the U.S. merchant fleet would be tasked with the support
of the military mission.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the U.S. Merchant
Marine is currently unable to perform its peacetime or
wartime mission. The methodology will be to examine the
missions to be performed by the Merchant Marine during the
different situations ranging from peace to war, and the
historical record established by the Merchant Marine in its
performance of these missions.
Missions
The United States' Merchant Marine has two missions.
The first mission is to conduct normal maritime trade, both
in peacetime and in wartime. The second mission is to
support the military effort of the United States.
At present, the domestic flag merchant fleet cannot
carry more than a small fraction of U.S. trade. The reasons
underlying the commercial industry's inability to carry a
fair proportion of domestic trade are many and complex; so
complex, in fact, that the reasons cannot be adequately
discussed in just a few pages. However, a superficial
examination of these problems is necessary.
The primary factor most critical to the decline of the
5u.s. flag merchant fleet can be summed up in one word:
cost. Due to high overhead, U.S. companies must charge a
high price to carry cargo. This situation allows competitors
with a lower overhead to successfully charge lower prices
and still be profitable.
High overhead for domestic vessels is caused by many
factors. Vessels built in the U.S. are very expensive.
Steel mills are located far from the ports which receive
the raw ore from abroad, and from the shipyards. Consequently,
the iron ore incurs transportation costs on its way to the
steel mill. U.S. steel mills are, for the most part,
antiquated, labor intensive, and inefficient. This increases
the cost of the steel even further. Finally, the steel is
sent to a shipyard, incurring still more transportation
costs.
Once the steel arrives at a shipyard, it is used in
the making of ships. Shipyards are very labor intensive
and have many unions. Due to the high wages and work
practices demanded by the unions and agreed to by the
shipyard owners, the building of ships takes longer and is
more expensive in the United States than in other countries.
Therefore, ships cost more money to build in the U.S.
because of the high cost of the materials and the high cost
of labor. When a ship owner pays a high price for his
ship. he must charge a high price for its services to
recover his investment.
A second major factor in the high freight rates charged
6by U.S. companies is the wages paid to crew as well as work
practices (such as guaranteed work, long vacations, overtime
pay, etc.). As a result, crew costs are usually higher for
domestic flag vessels than their foreign flag competitors.
In fact, all things being equal, crew costs alone would
make the U.S. merchant marine less competitive (Coffey,
March, 1983). While Operating Differential Subsidies
(ODS) reduce the magnitude of this factor, with the Reagan
Administration's desire to eliminate subsidies, the wage
costs become more acute.
There are other factors, as well, such as the current
recession, high fuel costs, etc. However, the net result
of all these factors is that the U.S. flag fleet is not
very competitive and is smaller than the volume of U.S.
trade would indicate. Consequently, the U.S. flag fleet
cannot carry the total commerce, or even half of the total
commerce, of the United States.
In peacetime, the mission of the merchant marine, to
conduct the U.S. commerce, is accomplished through a com-
bination of domestic and foreign flag vessels. While it
does not appear that, by itself, the domestic flag fleet
could perform its mission, with the "assistance" of foreign
flag vessels, the mission is accomplished.
However, in times of war or national emergency, the
U.S. merchant marine would have the added responsibility
of supporting the U.S. military mission in addition to its
peacetime mission. This paper will analyze the present
7ability of the merchant marine to effectively perform the
added mission of supporting the military, while continuing
to carry the U.S. commerce.
It is appropriate here to define some of the above
terms, such as Military Sealift Command Nucleus Fleet,
Ready Reserve Fleet, and National Defense Reserve Fleet.
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is a part of the
Navy and is tasked with the responsibility of moving all
waterborne military cargo. It has a four part mission:
1. MSC provides sealift capability for deployment
and support of U.S. forces and material in an
emergency;
2. MSC develops plans for expansion of sealift
capabilities during an emergency or in wartime;
3. MSC provides peacetime logistical support by
world-wide sealift of supplies, equipment, and
material;
4. MSC provides, mans, and operates ships used for
non-transportation purposes such as oceanographic
and hydrographic research (Evers, 1978, p. 2).
The Military Sealift Command is composed of a nucleus
fleet, owned by the government and crewed by U.S. civil
servants. As such, it is totally under MSC control. Also
utilized by MSC are chartered civilian ships. Some of
these vessels are "bareboat" charters. Under the terms of
this type of charter, the owner of the vessel leases the
vessel to MSC, who then provides a civil servant crew. In
addition to bareboat charters, MSC also has "time" or
"voyage" charters. These ships are leased by the owner
to MSC and the crewed with employees of that company.
In 1979, the Military Sealift Command had 70 ships in
8the nucleus fleet (MSC, 1979, p. 2). It has been projected
that the fleet will remain at this level until at least
1984. Table 1 is a listing of the number and types of
vessels in the nucleus fleet.
In the event of a non-mobilization contingency where
the MSC is unable to charter merchant ships, there are two
additional sources of shipping: Sealift Readiness Program
(SRP), and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) (Evers,
p. 14).
The Sealift Readiness Program is one in which commercial
companies who wish to carry military cargo in peacetime
agree to commit half of their vessels to military control
in the event of an emergency. There is a pre-determined
schedule for call-up, with all vessels being made available
to MSC within 60 days after notification.
Because these SRP ships are merchant vessels in active
service, they require little modification, such as radio
equipment, and can be made available fairly quickly and
easily.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet is a collection of
vessels kept in storage to be used by the MSC if necessary.
From an all time high of 2277 ships following World War II,
the NDRF has dwindled to 317 ships in 1981 (U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, 1981, p. 48). Table 2 shows the number of
ships in the NDRF from 1945 to 1981. These ships are
supposed to be activated within 4 weeks of notification.
The ships are located in three locations: James River,
Table 1
UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIPS
SUMMARY
-(EXT5)
-(T3S2)
-(T5)
-(TIB2)
-(S3S2)
-(S4SE)
-NAVY
TYPE
AF -(R3S4)
AG -(VI3)
AGM -(C4SA)
AGM -(ST2E)
AGM -(vI3)
AGM -(vI5)
AGOR-(CIME)
AGOR-NAVY
AGS -(C4SA)
AGS -NAVY
AGS -(vI3)
AK -(C3SD)
AK -(C4)
AK -(VI3)
AKC -(CIME)
AKR -(C3ST)
AKR -(C4ST)
AO
AO
AO
AO
AOG
ARC
ARC
ATF
NUMBER
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
4
1
6
2
1
1
5
1
1
1
16
1
7
4
3
2
1
4
CLASSIFICATION
Refrigerated Cargo
Miscellaneous
Missle Range Instru-
mentation
Oceanographic Research
Surveying
Dry Cargo
Dry Cargo (Coastal)
..
Tanker
Gasoline Tanker
Cable Repairing
Fleet Ocean Tug
(Source: Ship Register, Military Sealift Command, Washington
D.C., 1979)
Table 2
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET, 1945-1981
Fiscal Year Ships Fiscal Year Ships
1945 5 1963 1819
1946 1421 1964 1739
1947 1204 1965 1594
1948 1675 1966 1327
1949 1934 1967 1152
1950 2277 1968 1062
1951 1767 1969 1017
1952 1853 1970 1027
1953 1932 1971 860
1954 2067 1972 673
1955 2068 1973 541
1956 2061 1974 487
1957 1889 1975 419
1958 2074 1976 348
1959 2060 1977 333
1960 2000 1978 306
1961 1923 1979 317
1962 1862 1980 320
1981 317
(Source: MARAD Report, FY 1981)
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Virginia; Beaumont. Texas; and Suisun Bay. California. In
the event of an activation. some or all of these vessels
would be towed to various shipyards and be put into service.
Part of the NRDF is the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF).
This is a program whereby selected ships receive a high
degree of maintenance and can be re-activated within 10
days. Table 3 is the RRF Activation Schedule. This program
was established in 1976 when the Maritime Administration
(MARAD). prompted by changes in the Department of Defense
(DOD) sealift requirements that supplemental sealift
capacity be made available within 10 days. conducted an
investigation which showed that NDRF ships could not be
activated in less that 30-40 days. As a result of this
investigation. a memorandum of agreement was reached between
the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Navy
in 1977. This agreement specified that the Chief of Naval
Operations. with the concurrance of the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Maritime Affairs. would determine the
number of ships to be called-up. the types of ships. and
when these ships would be activated (Evers. p. 42).
Since the NRDF and the RRF are the only assets always
available to the MSC. they will be discussed in depth.
As stated earlier. the RRF was created when it was
determined that the NRDF could not respond to contingencies
quickly enough to meet new DOD requirements. In order to
upgrade the response time to comply with DOD directives.
the Department of the Navy and the Maritime Administration
Table 3
READY RESERVE FORCE ACTIVATION SCHEDULE
San Francisco, CA M-9
M-8
M-8
SEQ
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
VESSEL/LOCATION
James River
LAKE Philadelphia
PRIDE
SCAN
LONE STAR MARINER Baltimore
AGENT Cheatham Annex
OHIO
PUERTO RICO
CATAWBA VICTORY
YOUNG AMERICA
GREAT REPUBLIC
AMBASSADOR
CAPE AVINOF
CAPE ALAVA
CAPE ARCHWAY
CAPE ALEXANDER
CAPE ANN
ADVENTURER
CRACKER STATE MARINER
AIDE
OLD DOMINION MARINER
BANNER
Beaumont
PIONEER CRUSADER
PIONEER CONTRACTOR
SANTA ANA
MAINE
WASHINGTON
PIONEER COMMANDER
Suisun Bay
CALIFORNIA Oakland
LINCOLN
PRESIDENT
RETENTION
STATUS
5 days
5 days
5 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
10 days
5 days
5 days
5 days
PORT
Philadelphia
Norfolk, VA
Baltimore, MD
Norfolk, VA
Beaumont, TX
Galveston, TX
Beaumont, TX
READINESS DATE
M-9
M-9
M-9
M-4
M-4
M-4
M-4
M-2
M-2
M-2
M-2
M-2
M-l
M-l
M-l
M
M
M+l
M+l
M+l
M+2
M-4
M-4
M-2
M-3
M-3
M-2
(Source: Michael Blouin)
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conducted feasibility studies and decided to upgrade 30
Victory class ships. After further developments, the
decision was made to develop a carrying capacity of 340,000
measurement tons, which is approximately the capacity of 30
Victory class ships. This capacity was to be realized by
utilizing a mix of vessels instead of just using the
Victories. Of particular importance in the making of this
decision was the availability of SEATRAIN vessels, which
are excellent vessels in which to carry combat support
equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery, helicopters,
etc, due to the ship's wide hatches and clear deck space
(Evers, p. 46).
Gradually, the RRF has had vessels added to it until
the present time, where it has 33 vessels, with plans to
add more in the near future (Blouin, 15 April 1983).
The U.S. civilian fleet presently has about 500 vessels
in its inventory. This fleet is composed of many types of
vessels, only some of which are of use to the military.
Some of the vessels of varying degrees of application to
military service are Lift-On, Lift-Off (LOLO) container
ships, Roll-on, Roll-Off (ROjRO), Barge Carrying Vessels
(BCV's), consisting of both LASH, SEABEE, and break bulk.
More will be said about these vessels later in this
paper.
CHAPTER II
Degrees of Emergencies
There are various levels, or degrees, of national
emergencies. Each degree will require a different response
from the merchant marine. In 1954, the Secretary of Commerce
and the Secretary of Defense published an agreement, called
the Wilson-Weeks Agreement, which divides contingency oper-
ations into two categories: war or a declared national
emergency; and anything else (Kelly, 1961, pp. 17, 18).
This agreement establishes a priority use of shipping
during a war, but it does not address situations that are
not national emergencies. The ships to be used during a
war, in the order listed, are as follows:
1. Military Sealift Command Nucleus Fleet
2. Civilian liner/tramp service
3. Charter of civilian ships
4. National Defense Reserve Fleet
5. Foreign flag charters
A major problem with this agreement is that a war or
declared national emergency must exist before this agree-
ment comes into effect. However, this nation's involvement
in Korea, Viet Nam, and the Indian Ocean fell into the
second category: not a war or declared emergency. Yet
these three situations all placed demands on the merchant
marine to support a military mission in addition to the
15
normal peacetime maritime trade.
A second method of determining degrees of crisis was
established in a Memorandum between the Department of
Commerce and the Military Sealift Command. This agreement
delineates four situations ranging from normal peacetime
trade to full mobilization and the varying degrees of
involvement of the Merchant Marine (Dept. of Commerce/MSC
Memorandum, 1978, p. 2).
The first situation is normal peacetime circum-
stances. In this case, the Military Sealift Command's
nucleus fleet is to handle all military cargo. The next
situation is defined as a minor emergency. An example
of this might be the Iranian hostage situation in 1979-1981.
To meet the increased demand for vessels necessary to
carry military cargo, the MSC nucleus fleet would be aug-
mented by the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The third situation
would be a Non-Mobilization contingency. An example of
this would be the Viet Nam war. The increased need for
carrying military cargo would be met by the MSC nucleus
fleet, the RRF, the National Defense Reserve Force (NRDF),
and civilian shipping. The final situation is defined as
a full mobilization. An example of this is World War II.
Under these circumstances, all U.S. flag shipping would
be called upon.
Missions 2, 3, and 4 of the Military Sealift Command
are accomplished in peacetime with little difficulty.
Planning for contingencies, providing peacetime logistical
16
support, and manning special purpose vessels are all routine
operations conducted by the MSC. The carriage of peacetime
logistical support is accomplished by the nucleus fleet
and civilian charters. This results in an excess carrying
capacity. MSC justifies this with the reasoning that,
during an emergency, this presently wasted space would be
utilized (GAO, September, 1980, p. 9).
CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS
It appears that the MSC nucleus fleet can accomplish
the peacetime missions of the MSC. In the event of an
emergency, however, the civilian industry is going to be
called upon to provide additional ships.
Unfortunately, only the nucleus fleet and the chartered
fleet are under MSC's direct control. All other vessels
are under the control of their owners or other governmental
agencies, and can only be called upon when certain
circumstances exist. Accordingly, the performance of
these vessels depends on the willingness of the crew to
obey the dictates of MSC. While this should not be a
problem, it does render these vessels, albeit marginally,
subject to doubts concerning their willingness to obey MSC
orders.
Once the proper conditions have been met, MSC then has
access to U.S. flag civilian shipping. There are some
problems with this however. The U.S. flag shipping industry
is presently in a depressed state due to various economic
considerations. As a result, there are relatively few
ships available for MSC to call upon. A second problem is
that many of these vessels are technologically advanced and
require sophisticated port facilities for service. A third
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problem is that, with the advent of containerization, there
has been a reduction in the number of break-bulk vessels,
ships with a high military value due to their ability to
self load and unload.
In the event of a long term contingency operation, with
normal, peacetime "business as usual" pervailing throughout
the rest of the world, the vessels removed from commercial
usage on trade routes would be quickly replaced by foreign
flag competitor After the termination of the contingency
operation, these SRP vessels would experience difficulty
in re-entering the trade route. This difficulty could
result in the loss of business, the laying up of vessels,
and a further reduction in available shipping assets to
MSC.
The RRF is an important source of quick response
shipping, but, in no way does it lessen the importance of
the NDRF. At best, the RRF is simply a stop-gap measure,
and an indication that there are problems with the NDRF.
Periodically, the Navy and MARAD conduct tests to
ensure that these RRF ships can be ready for loading within
10 days of notification. Thus far, all ships have
successfully completed the test. While no attempt has yet
been made to activate the entire fleet, it is probable that
the majority of these vessels will be ready to go on time
(Maritime Administration, 1978, p. 7).
The NDRF situation is completely different than that
of the RRF. While the RRF can be activated quickly, it does
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not have the carrying capacity that will be required in the
event of a large contingency. Therefore, the NDRF will
have to be activated, and therein lies the problem. Some
of the difficulties in the activation of the NDRF that will
have to be overcome are discussed below.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet can be activated only
under certain circumstances. The authority to activate
ships of the NDRF exists only under conditions where civilian
ships are threatened with governmental requisitioning.
Section 11 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 states that:
"A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case
be used for any purpose whatsoever except that
any such vessel may be used for account of any
agency or department of the United States during
any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936, as amended."
Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 states:
"Whenever the President shall proclaim that the
security of the national defense makes it advisable
OR during a national emergency declared by pro-
CTamation of the President, it shall be lawful
for the commission to requisition ••• " (Emphasis added)
The result of these two laws is that the NDRF can be
activated only when the threat of governmental requisitioning
exists, and that requisitioning can occur only when the
national security is in danger or during a declared national
emergency.
The commercial maritime industry has feared the creation
of a national fleet which could compete with them. This
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helps to explain the limitation in the laws cited. Industry
fears also spurred the Wilson-Weeks agreement, already
discussed, which states that the NDRF can be activated only
after all commercial assets have been utilized.
Once the proper circumstances exist for the activation
of the NDRF, various administrative steps must be taken.
These steps are displayed in Table 4.
After the administrative steps have been taken, other
problems arise in the activation of NDRF ships. These
problems include the availability of shipyard space, hull
and machinery repairs, spare parts, manpower in shipyards,
manpower for crews, certifications, etc. Some of these
problems are discussed below.
A brief history of the NDRF is important because it
allows patterns to emerge. During the "police action" in
Korea, ships of the NDRF were activated to support the
military mission. Since most of these vessels had seen
little service in World War II before their transfer to
the reserve fleet, and since activation occurred within
six or seven years, the material condition of these
vessels was fairly good. On the average, these vessels
were ready for service within five to seven days (Maritime
Administration, p.7).
While the vessels were available within a short period
of time, crewing the vessels proved to be a major problem.
The activation of NDRF ships greatly increased the number
of sea-going billets. These billets proved to be very
TABLE 4
ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS REQUIRED FOR THE
ACTIVATION OF THE NDRF
Requirement established
I
Assessment of controlled (nucleus) fleet capability
to meet requirement
Assessment of berth shipping capability
to meet requirement
I
Testing of domestic charter market for
availability of new charters
I
Presidential proclamation of state of national
emergency
I
DOD decision to activate NDRF
I
MSC sends activation request to MARAD
I
Preparation of cost estimate by MARAD
I
MSC evaluates MARAD's estimate
I
MSC approves cost and provides funding
I
MARAD starts activation process
(Source: Evers, p.35)
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difficult to fill due to the high wages being paid for
ashore jobs. As a result, many ships which were materially
ready for sailing were delayed due to manpower shortages.
Filling the entry level positions was not that difficult,
but there were acute problems finding experienced, licensed
engineers, radio operators, and able-bodied seamen (MARAD, p. 7).
In summary, vessel activation was accomplished in a
timely manner due to the young age of these ships and the
lack of deterioration. However, it was difficult to provide
manpower for crews.
Upon the completion of the Korean War and the termination
of the requirements to have this extra shipping capacity,
many vessels were again transferred to the NDRF. While in
the reserve, these vessels were preserved by a method called
contact preservation. This method of preservation basically
consists of covering the ship, both inside and outside,
with layers of various preservation materials. This method
of preservation is not very effective and, combined with a
general lack of maintenance caused by a lack of funding,
the material condition of the ships deteriorated steadily
(Evers, p. 68)
When, during the Viet Nam conflict, there was an
increased demand for carrying capacity, vessels of the NDRF
were again activated. However, during this activation
process, many problem areas arose, such as increased
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activation time, increased costs, shortages of repair yard
capability and crew shortages.
The first 14 vessls were ready for service in 21 days
(MARAD, p. 42). This was accomplished by around-the-clock
shipyard work and shortcuts being taken. Sea trials were
also eliminated. However, the next 37 vessels took an
average of 42 days to activate, much longer than anticipated.
This delay was caused by the deteriorated condition of the
ships, and the corresponding need for greater, and longer,
repair work. Another cause for the delay was the inability
of the shipyards to assign a priority to the NDRF, due to
the business as usual attitude pervailing in the industry
(MARAD, p. 8).
As the shipyards were working 24 hours a day, costs
rose dramatically. In an effort to cut costs, DOD requested
that additional ships be activated on a "least cost" basis.
Accordingly, the shipyards eliminated the 24 hour shifts.
This resulted in more delays. The average time for the
activation of the second half of 101 ships was 2 months
(MARAD, p. 42).
After activation, a number of ships experienced
mechanical failures serious enough to warrant additional
shipyard time. Eventually, the majority of ships were
adequate for the tasks assigned.
As in the Korean conflict, difficulties were experienced
in providing the manpower necessary to crew the ships. The
sudden increase in the number of sea going billets far
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exceeded the available manpower. Critical shortages occurred
in the billets requiring experienced mariners, and some
vessels had to sail shorthanded, or delay sailing altogether.
From 1966 to 1968, approximately 42 percent of the vessels
sailing to Viet Nam had to delay their departure (MARAD,
p. 42).
The present manning situation is not very different
than that experienced during the Viet Nam war. It has been
estimated that, if activated, the NDRF would require over
11,600 additional billets (Dept. of Commerce/MSC Memorandum,
1978, p. 2). It would be extremely difficult to find the
manpower that these billets require.
However, all is not hopeless. There are approximately
4,000 civil servant mariners not assigned to MSC. These
mariners work for NOAA, Department of the Interior, and the
Army Corps of Engineers. In an emergency, and with the
concurrance of the various departments, these mariners
could be transferred to the MSC. In addition, there are
numerous peripheral vessels which may be viewed as a source
of manpower. These vessels include oil exploration ships,
ferries, barges, tugs, and research vessels (DOT/MSC Memo, p. 2).
Unfortunately, the MSC must rely on the patriotism of
these mariners to volunteer for service. There is presently
no authority to draft civilians and make them work on ships
during an emergency situation (DOT/MSC Memo, p. 2).
While there has been a decline in sea going billets,
there are other emergency sources of manpower. The U.S.
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Merchant Marine Academy and the five state maritime
academies can provide officers. Emergency legislation could
allow retired mariners to be recalled to active service.
Reduction of vacation time and a lower turnover rate would
make more mariners available. Other solutions include the
utilization of peripheral vessel personnel, increased recruit-
ment, lower standards, and easier licensing of crewmembers.
One bright spot to this otherwise dismal picture is
that the crewmen on civilian vessels frequently work for
three months with the next three months off as vacation time.
In effect, then, each vessel has two complete crews, each crew
working for half of the year. Since there are approximately
12,000 billets in the vessels of the civilian industry, and
each billet has 2 crewmen, then by keeping one crew on a
vessel for the whole year, an additional 12,000 crewmen are
available for service on another ship. This alone would go
a long way towards solving the manpower problem in manning
NDRF ships. The real difficulty with this solution is
getting the maritime unions to agree with it (Coffey, 29 March
1983). This will probably require almost a full mobilization
effort.
Three different situations will be briefly examined
concerning the manpower constraints: minor emergency,
non-mobilization contingency, and full mobilization. A minor
emergency is defined as a situation where the RRF would be
activated, there would be shortages in experienced engineering
and radio officers. The maritime unions would have to give
priority to manning RRF ships. In a non-mobilization contingency,
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almost full mobilization activity would be required to man the
RRF and the NDRF. Not only would the unions have to give
priority to manning NDRF ships, they would also have to cut
back drastically on vacation time. Shortages would still
occur. During a full mobilization, the unions would have to
reduce the vacation time of their members even further. Even
with this activity, many vessels would have to sail shorthanded,
or delay sailing altogether.
In summary, finding the manpower to crew the ships
presently available in the RRF and the NDRF would require
an almost full mobilization effort. Retired mariners would
be recalled, a massive recruitment would be instigated,
vacation time would be curtailed, and some vessels would
sail shorthanded.
Since the Viet Nam activation of the NDRF, numerous
changes have occurred in the preservation of the vessels.
A major problem with the previous method, the contact
method, was that the layers tended to harden over time. As
a result, it became very time-consuming and expensive to
remove these layers when the ship was activated. These
vessels are also protected by cathodic protection. Under
the new method of preservation, vessels are sealed and
dehumidified. This severely retards deterioration. In
this method, metal plates are located in the harbor floor
directly beneath the ships. An electrical currect is passed
through the plates and into the hulls. This serves to harden
the hull and is very effective in the prevention of oxidation,
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or rust.
A problem that has existed in the past and continues
to plague the NDRF is the lack of funding for maintenance.
As each year goes by, the age of the NDRF increases,
requiring greater attention to maintenance tasks to ensure
that these ships will be ready to respond quickly to an
activation order. However, the budgetary allowance for
maintenance is less than 1 percent of the MARAD budget
(MARAD FY 1981 Report, p. 49). This level of funding is
insufficient to prevent deterioration.
Ships today must comply with a variety of regulations
to be allowed to operate in the U.S. Most of these regulations
were issued after the ships of the NDRF were built. As a
result, many, if not most, NDRF vessels cannot meet the
new regulations. These new regulations include anti-pollution
devices such as an oily waste tank to hold
contaminated bilge water and sanitation equipment to prevent
the discharge of raw sewage into the harbor. It is a fairly
simple matter to modify existing facilities of these vessels
to comply with these particular requirements, but some of
the other regulations are not as easily satisfied. In some
instances, compliance will require extensive modifications
that are both expensive and time consuming (Evers, p. 73).
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS) both require inspections. These inspections,
especially in the case of the ABS, are extensive and thorough.
It is presently unlikely that the ships in the NDRF could
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pass these inspections. The Coast Guard will waive many
requirements, but that does not absolve the government
from any claims of damage caused by vessels not meeting
the published standards. The ABS inspection is primarily
for the commercial industry. It insures that a shipper is
not sending his cargo on a vessel that is unseaworthy.
Since the shipper on NDRF vessels will be the United States
Government, this inspection should not cause too great a
concern.
CHAPTER IV
SHIP TYPES
Once the proper circumstances exist for the utilization
of merchant shipping for military purposes, the next area
to be discussed is the types of vessels available. This
section analyzes the various types of merchant vessels
presently in the commercial inventory and their possible
uses in a military situation.
There are three general categories of vessels: dry
cargo, passenger, and tanker. In addition, each category
has various types of vessels included within it. The
following is a discussion of the types and categories of
vessels and the possible application of each in various
military situations.
Under the category of dry cargo, there are breakbulk,
container/self-sustaining, container/non self-sustaining,
Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO), Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), Sea
Barge (SEABEE), and bulk. Each will be discussed in turn.
A breakbulk vessel is one in which general cargo is
stored within cargo holds on the ship. A breakbulk vessel
stows quantities of various types of cargoes, with little
effort made to segregate the cargo, except that separation
necessary for the safety of the ship and cargo. For example,
a case of food might be stowed next to a case of machinery.
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The only limitation as to what dry cargo may be carried is
determined by the size of the deck hatches and the hoisting
capacity of the cargo cranes.
A vessel of this type is very valuable for military
usage. Large deck hatches enable this vessel to carry a
variety of cargo, notably tanks, trucks, artillery, and
other equipment too large or heavy for a container. With
its inherent crane, it needs only a pier or lighters on
which to unload its cargo. This feature allows this vessel
to operate in fairly primative areas, or areas where, for
a variety of reasons (combat damage), sophisticated pier
facilities are not available.
The disadvantage of this type of vessel is that it
takes a relatively long time to load and unload. In
situations where speedy delivery of cargo is essential,
this type of vessel may not be able to respond quickly
enough.
In 1979, there were 136 vessels of this type flying the
u.s. flag and five vessels under effective U.S. control
(EUSC)* (Military Sealift Command, April 1979, p. 7) Unfor-
tunately, with the advent of specialization, these general
purpose dry cargo vessels are declining in number.
A self-sustained container ship is one in which cargo
is first loaded into containers (normally 20'x8'x8' boxes).
These containers are then loaded on board the ship. Self-
* Effective U.S. control means that these ships are
owned by U.S. companies, but registered under foreign
flags. These are sometimes referred to as "Flags of
Convenience" or "Flags of Necessity"
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sustained means that these vessels carry their own cranes
with which to load and unload cargo.
Containerization is a fairly recent development in the
commercial industry which has revolutionized the carriage
of goods. The primary advantage of containers is the speed
with which cargo can be loaded and unloaded aboard ships.
This fast unloading capability, coupled with the vessel's
ability to unload itself, make this type of vessel extremely
valuable to the military. As with a breakbulk vessel, a
self-sustained container ship needs only a pier on which to
unload. This feature increases the areas of the world
where this type of vessel can be utilized. A faster ability
to unload means that this vessel has a shorter turnaround
time; therefore fewer ships are necessary for replenishment.
One disadvantage of this type of vessel, for the
military, is that not all military cargo can fit into
containers. While the Sea Shed idea helps resolve this
problem, this still means that some military cargo will have
to be sent by other types of vessels.
One future difficulty is that, due to the space that
cranes take up on the deck, and the capital costs, most
container ships being built today do not have cranes. As
the ships with cranes get older and are retired from service,
an extremely important asset will be lost to the military.
In 1979, there were fifteen vessels under U.S. flag and two
under EUSC (Military Sealift Command, 1979, p. 8).
Non self-sustained container ships are like the vessel
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described above, except they do not have cranes installed.
The advantages are the same, except that this type of vessel
can carry more cargo by utilizing the space for containers
where other vessels utilize for cranes.
The disadvantage of this type of vessel is that it
requires sophisticated equipment at the pier to load and
discharge. This severly limits the areas where this vessel
would be useful. Most containers are too heavy to be lifted
by helicopter. The U.S. Army is developing watercraft to
carry containers to the shore (Schoch, 1979, p. 20).
However, until these watercraft are developed and brought
to the port, this type of vessel is of limited value in
most areas of the world.
Since this vessel is more economical, due to its
ability to carry more cargo, there are more non self-
sustaining vessels than self-sustaining. In 1979, there
were 89 U.S. flag vessels and one EUSC vessel (MSC, 1979,
p. 7).
The Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) vessel is one in which
vehicles can be driven on and off under their own power,
and they don't have to use a hoist. This vessel is an
excellent ship to carryall manner of military vehicles,
such as tanks, jeeps, truck, Armoured Personnel Carriers,
self-propelled artillery, etc. The vehicles can be unloaded
in a matter of hours. The disadvantages of this vessel
are that there is wasted space on board, and the fact that
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this vessel has almost no compartmentization*. Also, the decks
of commercial vessels may not be strong enough to carry
heavy military equipment.
The next two types of vessels are the Lighter Aboard
Ship (LASH) and the Sea Barge (SEABEE). Both types of
vessels are similar in that in both types cargo placed
in self-contained barges (lighters), and the vessels them-
selves have the capability to load these containers. The
LASH utilizes a crane, while the SEABEE uses an elevator.
Both vessels are very important for military uses
because neither vessel requires more than the most rudimentary
of port facilities, if any facilities are required at all.
All that is required is a tug, or something that can ferry
the lighters or barges from the ship to the shore. As a
result, these vessels can be used even in the most battle
damaged areas. In 1979, there were nineteen LASH/SEABEE
type vessels under the U.S. flag and four under EUSC (MSC,
1979, p. 7).
The second general category is passenger vessels.
These are vessels which carry passengers and some cargo.
They tend to cater to the creature comforts of their
passengers, and as such are not of too much use to the
military. However, as the British so ably demonstrated,
passenger liners can be converted into troop carriers fairly
* Compartmentization is a method of eliminating large
open spaces in the ship as a damage control precaution.
This makes the ship more survivable if it is damaged.
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quickly and easily, and troop carriers have a high military
importance. Passenger vessels can also serve as hospital
ships. There are presently two passenger vessels flying
the u.s. flag: Oceanic Independance and Constitution.
The final category is that of tankers. These vessels
normally carry petroleum products, but there are special
purpose tankers that carry a variety of liquid cargoes.
Table 5 shows the inventory of U.S. controlled ships.
Tankers have an obvious military importance. Napoleon
stated that an army marches on its stomach. If he were
around today, he would probably say that an army drives on
its gas tank. Todays military is highly mechanized, and
requires vast amounts of gasoline and aviation fuel.
Tankers will allow the military to move.
Table 5
INVENTORY OF U.S. CONTROLLED SHIPS
U.S. FLAG FOREIGN FLAG
TYPE NO. DWT
* NO. DWT *
Dry cargo
breakbulk 136 1,863 5 49
Container
self-sus. 15 233 2 5
Container
non self-sus. 89 1,637 1 10
RO/RO 20 318 6 36
LASH/SEABEE 19 706 4 120
Passenger 0 0 9 67
Tanker
major 227 12,838 292 42,892
Special 24 888 25 910
* DWT in 1,000 tons
(Source: SHIP REGISTER, Military Sealift Command, Department
of the Navy, Washington, D.C., p.7.)
CHAPTER V
SCENARIOS
Having conducted an examination of the various shipping
assets available to the Military Sealift Command in the four
types of situations, it is appropriate here to analyze the
response of these shipping assets in each of the various
levels of emergency.
In these scenarios, it is assumed that a "business as
usual" attitude prevails throughout the world with the
exception of the area of emergency. This has been the case
during the Korean War, the Viet Nam War and the Iranian
Hostage situation.
During normal peacetime operations, the purpose of the
civilian fleet, to conduct the maritime trade of the United
States, is handled through a combination of domestic and
foreign flag vessels. While the domestic flag fleet is
unable to carry more than a small fraction of this nation's
trade, foreign flag competitors carry the remaining portion
of the trade. The net result is that international trade
is conducted satisfactorily. It is probably unwise to be
so dependant on foreign flag vessels for U.S. commerce;
however, the peacetime mission is accomplished.
The Military Sealift Command sends cargo on the Nucleus
Fleet and on chartered civilian vessels. This excess
37
capacity results in the wasting of government money, but it
does allow for quick response to situations.
The planning mission of MSC concerning the expansion
of sealift capabilities during an emergency is being carried
out. A Sealift Readiness Branch has been formed in MSC to
manage the acquisition and operation of the ship mobilization
programs (MSC, June 1981). In summary, all peacetime
missions are being accomplished, although not by U.S.
vessels.
If a minor emergency situation would occur, the MSC
Nucleus Fleet would attempt to carry the increased cargo
demanded by this situation. If this was not adequate,
then the presently chartered vessels would be utilized.
Then, according to the terms of the Wilson-Weeks agreement,
civilian liners and charters would be sought.
If the Viet Nam experience is any indication of what
can be expected in the future, and there is no reason why
it should not, domestic ahip owners will request that the
Ready Reserve Force and the National Defense Reserve Force
be activated (Blouin, 15 April 1983). During the Viet Nam
war, ships of the Sealift Enhancement Program were utilized.
However, once these vessels were removed from liner service,
they experienced major difficulties in re-entering the
trade routes upon completion of their SEP service. As a
result, the shipowners were faced with a long-term revenue
loss. Accordingly, they requested the activation of the
NDRF. It is reasonable to assume that, under similar
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circumstances, ship owners will again request that NDRF
ships be used.
Under this assumption, the RRF ships will probably be
activated. Most, if not all, activated vessels should be
ready to load within the ten day time frame. While the
ships themselves will be ready, it is likely that shortages
will occur in selected billets, at least during the early
stages of the emergency. The maritime unions would have to
assign a priority to the manning of these ships to avoid
delays in sailing. Even so, some ships will sail short-
handed. In spite of these spot shortages, the RRF ships
will sail.
In summary, the merchant fleet owners will probably
request that the NDRF be activated. Again, the mission
will be accomplished, but primarily through the RRF, not
the civilian fleet.
In a non-mobilization contingency, the nucleus fleet,
civilian charters, SEP vessels, and RRF ships would prove
to be insufficient to meet the increased demand for carrying
capacity. The NDRF would have to be activated. For the
same reasons as stated above, the SEP vessels would not be
available to the MSC for long. After the RRF is activated,
then the rest of the NDRF would be called-up. These vessels
will be ready for loading within 60 to 90 days of notification.
The final scenario is that of full mobilization. In
this case, all u.s. flag shipping and shipping under effective
U.S. control would become available to the MSC. In addition,
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it is highly likely that our allies will mobilize their
shipping as well. However, assuming that the U.S. is
alone in perceiving the emergency, then the domestic flag
fleet would be hard pressed to carry out both functions:
maritime trade and military support. Most planning concerning
full mobilization concentrates on a war involving NATO
countries. If the cause of U.S. mobilization were centered
away from Europe, in the Arab oil fields, for example,
would the NATO nations support the United States if the
NATO nations were not directly affected? Because there is
legitimate doubt about NATO's support in certain situations,
only U.S. controlled assets can be depended upon.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the assets of the civilian
merchant marine and its ability to support operations in
four different levels of emergency.
It is apparent that the civilian fleet cannot perform
whatever missions are assigned to it. During peacetime.
95 percent by weight of imports and exports are carried by
vessels registered in other nations. In the unlikely
event that foreign flag vessels refuse to carry domestic
commerce, the U.S. industry could not carry the tonnages
required to maintain this economy.
In the other levels of emergency. it is always the RRF
and the NDRF that is called upon to carry whatever excess
tonnages are necessary in the situation. The potential
utilization of the Sealift Readiness Program vessels has
caused howls of protest from shipowners. It is only in a
full mobilization that domestic shipping assets are made
available to the MSC. and, even then. these assets are
insufficient to adequately carry out the two assigned
missions. When U.S. assets presently carry less than 5
percent by weight of domestic cargo. it is ludicrous to
expect these assets to carry the other 95 percent.
While it is highly unlikely that foreign flag vessels
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will stop calling at U.S. ports and that our NATO allies
will forsake us, there have been instances where the United
States has stood alone and risked the emnity of the rest of
the world. A recent example of this is the refusal of the
United States to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty. Should
emotions run high during some future crisis, the dependance
on foreign flag shipping may hurt the U.S. economically and
militarily.
There are some possible solutions to the problem of
the inability of the merchant marine to perform its missions.
The easiest solution is to simply leave thing as they
are. The U.S. merchant marine should not be expected to
do too much since it can not. The missions of the merchant
fleet should be re-assigned elsewhere. For example, the
RRF and the NDRF should be assigned total responsibility
for the carriage of military cargo. Since the peacetime
mission of the merchant marine is being carried out by
foreign flag vessels, the U.S. can simply assign the mission
of carriage of trade to those vessels. To do this would
acknowledge reality.
The least expensive solution to the U.S. is the adoption
of the UNCTAD treaty. If the treaty is adopted, this would
be a tremendous boost to the maritime industry. The cargo
reservations provisions within the treaty guarantee U.S.
vessels up to 40 percent of international trade. This
would allow for a greater number of vessels, built by the
shipowners, and provide for better assets for use during a
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mobilization. However, given the "free market" philosophy
of the Reagan Administration, adoption of this treaty is
unlikely.
A final possible solution is the creation of a
nationalized merchant marine. Since governmental ownership
and/or subsidies appear to be the norm rather than the
exception, this solution would simply cause the U.S. to be
part of the majority. This solution runs contrary to the
current administration's plan to eliminate subsidies, which
is evidenced by the non-continuation of the Construction
Differential Subsidy (CDS). There are also many valid
reasons against nationalization. Never-the-less, national-
ization should be considered as a possible solution.
Without some solution to the present situation, the
U.S. merchant marine cannot be considered to be a realistic
asset to the United States, since it has failed to perform
any mission, even normal peacetime trade, successfully.
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